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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the history of the regulation of risk 
management in the banking industry.  Despite the centrality of risk 
management to contemporary banking law and regulation, its fundamental 
precepts have largely escaped scrutiny.  This Article first summarizes what 
it means to manage risk and then contrasts a traditional story of risk 
management regulation with an alternative story.  The traditional story 
posits that regulatory interventions are practical, functional responses to 
threats to the achievement of regulators’ statutory mandates of system-wide 
financial stability and institution-level safety and soundness.  In the course 
of summarizing this traditional account, the Article undertakes the first 
systematic review of the legislative and regulatory actions by which risk 
management became a public regulatory subject.  The alternative story, by 
contrast, acknowledges the empirical fact of risk management as an 
enhanced regulatory priority, but interrogates its normative assumptions.  It 
presents the regulatory focus on risk management as more of a cultural 
crutch in response to growing anxiety about endemic uncertainty in 
financial markets—as a reflection of the aspirations underlying the practice 
rather than the practice as such.  Particular attention is given to how 
regulators have prioritized questions of risk control over more basic 
questions of risk assessment, and, in the process, have failed to take 
account of how banks and regulators view risk in different terms.  Though 
its implications are troubling, this alternative story sheds light on where 
authorities should focus reform efforts to improve risk management 
regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, the regulation of risk management has become one 
of the key pillars of bank regulation, with Congress and bank regulators 
both routinely addressing the internal corporate risk management practices 
of banks.  As early as the mid-1990s, it became plausible to refer to a “new 
religion” of risk management in finance.
1
  Despite the centrality of risk 
management to banking law and regulation, its fundamental precepts have 
largely escaped scrutiny.
2
  The dearth of attention to risk management 
regulation does not reflect a lack of relevance so much as the disorganized, 
 
 1.  Peter L. Bernstein, The New Religion of Risk Management, HARV. BUS. REV. 47 
(Mar. 1996). 
 2.  Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Washington, D.C. (Jun. 12, 2006) [hereinafter 
Bernanke Stonier School Remarks] available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060612a.htm  (describing 
regulators’ review of risk management systems as the “heart of the modern bank 
examination”).  
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often confounding, manner by which authorities have addressed the issue.  
This article undertakes the first exploration of the dogmas and the history 
of this new near-religious faith on the part of public law authorities that 
regulated banks are able to manage and control risk.  The research 
presented here traces how these authorities have sought to influence risk 
management norms and practices.  It uncovers a regulatory canon that has 
set forth increasingly expansive mandates that bank boards of directors and 
senior management understand and control risks.  While articulating ever-
broader expectations of risk control, these authorities have left critically 
undeveloped key questions of risk assessment—including, most 
prominently, questions that touch on organizational goals and the events 
that threaten those goals.  A troubling alternative history emerges from this 
study:  risk management regulation is in practice more an attempt to 
maintain the appearance of control than an effective regulatory program 
promoting a managerial antidote to new sources of instability and volatility 
in financial markets. 
Part I introduces the idea of risk management and presents a general 
theory of risk management.  The general theory describes a broader 
intellectual and organizational discipline than the set of practices familiar 
to bank risk managers.  By starting from a broad reference frame, it will be 
easier to identify certain idiosyncrasies, described further in Parts II and III, 
of contemporary risk management practice as it has been developed by 
industry and influenced by bank regulatory law.  Risk management is 
presented as a two-part process consisting of risk assessment and risk 
control.  Risk assessment describes the processes by which an organization 
considers its goals and explores how contingent events might affect the 
achievement of those goals.  These processes therefore occur along a 
political-rhetorical dimension that asks, “What objectives matter to the 
organization, and what constitutes a threat to them?” and a descriptive-
relational dimension that asks, “In what ways do future contingent events 
affect the achievement of these objectives?”  Once threats to organizational 
goals are identified and their causal environments are explored, risk control 
requires an organization to put in place procedures designed to manage 
those threats in a consistent, reliable way. 
Part II describes what I term the traditional story of risk management, 
according to which regulatory interventions are practical, functional 
responses to threats to the achievement of regulators’ statutory mandates of 
system-wide financial stability and institution-level safety and soundness.  
This traditional theory portrays a dynamic, dialogic process whereby 
regulators identify risks and vulnerabilities and deputize bank risk 
management departments to counteract them, producing increasingly 
detailed guidance and imposing ever-wider expectations along the way.  
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Though the story depicted here is labeled “traditional,” its proponents self-
consciously advocated for and utilized non-traditional regulatory 
approaches.  The regulatory interventions in this context eschewed 
conventional regulatory techniques that mandated organizational behaviors 
or regulated outputs.  Instead, public lawmakers focused on influencing the 
internal bank systems and procedures on which financial stability and 
safety-and-soundness depended.  Though this phenomenon is not unique to 
banking law and regulation, bank regulators’ approach to risk management 
regulation is certainly one of the most salient examples of these changing 
regulatory techniques. 
This story begins in sub-Part A with a brief description of the 
development of derivatives markets, and highlights the dual nature of 
derivatives as both risk-reducing and risk-expanding instruments.  
Particular attention is given to how derivatives expand the dimensionality 
of risk and introduce new managerial challenges.  Next, sub-Part B traces 
how internal controls became a subject of public law and regulation.  
Public law authorities increasingly came to recognize that the 
organizational complexity of regulated entities, both inside and outside the 
banking sector, increasingly required regulators to focus their attention on 
systems of internal control.  Internal controls refer to the set of: (i) pre-
defined organizational responses to particular risks; and (ii) those processes 
to make sure the correct responses are in fact being applied and working as 
intended.  These regulatory interventions began in the narrow context of 
legal compliance and financial reporting, but private sector norms of 
internal control gradually expanded to direct organizations to implement 
systematized, rationalized approaches to all risks. 
Sub-Parts C and D describe how bank regulators came to embrace a 
broader, more comprehensive form of risk management that went beyond 
internal control.  In particular, sub-Part C examines bank regulatory 
guidance concerning risk management to be considered during the bank 
examination process, when regulators and bank management interface and 
discuss, usually informally, bank performance in the shadow of regulators’ 
more draconian enforcement powers.  The bank examination process 
during this period transformed from a review of bank balance sheets and 
loan books to a full-fledged review of corporate risk management 
programs.  This sub-Part analyzes selected regulatory actions and uncovers 
three predominant stages of risk management regulation during this period:  
(i) responsibility allocation and internal risk control; (ii) threat description 
and control; and (iii) construction of a system of comprehensive enterprise 
protection.  As regulators moved through the successive stages, they set 
forth increasingly broad mandates for banks to understand and control 
risks.  Sub-Part D documents how the capital adequacy regime, the linchpin 
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of the bank regulatory apparatus, also transformed into risk management 
regulation.  Starting in the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, the bank 
capital adequacy rules gradually came to set bank capital requirements by 
reference to estimates of exposures generated and used by internal risk 
management departments, another example of regulators attempting to 
shape risk management practices. 
Part III presents a contrasting alternative story of risk management 
regulation.  This alternative story acknowledges the empirical fact of risk 
management as an enhanced organizational and regulatory priority, but 
interrogates its normative assumptions.  It presents the regulatory focus on 
risk management as more of a cultural crutch in response to growing 
anxiety about endemic uncertainty, framing regulation as a reflection of the 
aspirations underlying risk management rather than risk management as 
such.  It sees in risk management a placeholder delimiting the range of 
objects that demand organizational control rather than the range of objects 
that are in fact susceptible to such control.  According to this alternative 
story, it is unsurprising that research into risk management reveals what 
might otherwise seem a paradox:  risk management is “accepted by all” in 
spite of a poor track record.
3
  Part III explains further why this equivocal 
record of risk management regulation results from the tendency of bank 
regulators to privilege risk control over fundamental, but contestable, issues 
that touch on risk assessment.  Simplifying only slightly, regulators have 
commanded banks to control risk, but offer little guidance on how banks 
are to identify threats or how much effort banks are expected to spend 
exploring how those threats might materialize.  Particular attention is given 
to: (i) how the divergent microeconomic incentives of bank management 
and bank regulators complicate the political-rhetorical dimension of risk 
assessment; and (ii) how the introduction of complexity into financial 
markets frustrates the descriptive-relational dimension of risk assessment.  
Whether risk management regulation in the banking sector will overcome 
the shortcomings identified by the alternative story and meet the 
expectations of the traditional story will depend on the extent to which 
regulators are able to engage the risk assessment process as such and foster 
a new mindful decision-making infrastructure within bank boardrooms and 
executive suites. 
 
 3.  GRANT KIRKPATRICK, ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/1/42229620.pdf [hereinafter OECD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REPORT]. 
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I. RISK MANAGEMENT AS RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK 
CONTROL 
The term “risk management” is overbroad and in need of some 
conceptual splitting before it can be a proper subject of inquiry.
4
  In much 
of the financial and practitioner literature on risk management, the 
embedded assumptions that condition the practice of risk management in 
financial institutions are not acknowledged.  This Part will take up the 
following questions:  “What is risk?”; “What does it mean to manage 
risk?”; and “What is the role of regulators in risk management?”  The 
general framework advocated here conceives of risk management as a two-
part process.   First, an organization must engage in risk assessment, a task 
that requires consideration of organizational goals and deliberation on how 
future contingent events affect achievement of those goals.  The second 
part of risk management requires an organization to control, or manage, the 
risks identified and explored during the risk assessment exercise. 
Any analysis of risk assessment must necessarily start with the term 
“risk,” which in its broadest sense is a descriptive, relational concept 
linking possible future events to observable future states of the world.
5
  
Starting from this broad definition, risk analysis must begin with defining 
“risk objects”—i.e., those ideas about how contingencies relate causally to 
future harm.
6
  This basic building block of risk analysis then describes the 
connection between possibility and reality.
7
  A risk might exist only where 
a future contingency has a possibility of occurring and impacting the future 
in some relevant manner.  With advances in statistical science and data 
gathering techniques, risk is increasingly expressed in quantitative terms.
8
 
However, nothing prevents even those risks that are presently 
incapable of being analyzed in terms of probabilities from being studied 
and understood as a risk object in terms of cause-and-effect.  When risk 
objects become the units of inquiry, the oft-echoed distinction between 
 
 4.  See MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY 3 (2007) (“Philosophers remind us 
to be wary of assuming that our most treasured nouns refer to anything, and this is nowhere 
more true than in the case of ‘risk.’”). 
 5.  ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE 1-2 (2008).  “Risk” is itself a highly contested 
concept.  See Ortwin Renn, Three Decades of Risk Research: Accomplishments and New 
Challenges, 1 J. RISK RESEARCH 49, 50 (1998) [hereinafter Accomplishments and 
Challenges] (“Talking about risks faces the immediate danger that everybody talks about 
something different . . . .”). 
 6.  Stephen Hilgartner, The Social Construction of Risk Objects: Or, How to Pry Open 
Networks of Risk, in ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS 39 (Lee Ben Clarke & 
James F. Short eds. 1992). 
 7.  Accomplishments and Challenges, supra note 5, at 51. 
 8.  See generally THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS (1995) (discussing the 
modern rise of quantification and its effect on culture). 
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uncertainty and risk ceases to demarcate the frontier of risk management.  
Even when the causal environment cannot be expressed probabilistically, it 
may still allow for prudential and precautionary efforts to minimize risk or 
counterfactual simulations to explore the impact of events.  This 
intellectual discipline especially helps when exploring remote events with 
potentially catastrophic impacts. 
But this descriptive-relational dimension of risk describes only part of 
the nature of risk.  In order for a contingency to amount to a risk, it must 
also have a political and rhetorical dimension.  For example, the 
movements of an ant from time T1 to time T2 can be measured using 
probabilistic analysis of cause-and-effect, but until a wager is hazarded on 
the whereabouts of the ant, we would not describe the ant’s movements as 
risky.  As David Garland observes, “risks never exist outside of our 
knowledge of them.”
9
  Instead, “[t]hey are the product of future-oriented 
human calculations—assessments made by people in the face of an 
uncertain world and the possibilities that it holds for them.”
10
  Any 
definition of risk therefore requires value judgments regarding which 
“future-oriented human calculations” should be the focus of analysis.
11
  
Values, priorities, and risk perceptions must be considered in this 
analysis.
12
  
For example, consider how risk assessors might compare the relative 
riskiness of Product A, which will result in fifty deaths per year from 
 
 9.  David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48, 52 (Richard Victor 
Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003). 
 10.  Id.; see also François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 197, 
199 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (“Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in 
reality.  But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes 
the danger, considers the event.”). 
 11.  Garland, supra note 9, at 52; see also Baruch Fischhoff et al., Defining Risk, 17 
POL’Y SCI. 123, 123-24, 137 (1984) (explaining the effects of a changing definition of risk 
according to decision-maker or the problem he faces); cf. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE 
GODS: THE REMARKABLE HISTORY OF RISK 8 (1996) (“The word ‘risk’ derives from the 
early Italian risicare, which means ‘to dare.’  In this sense, risk is a choice rather than a fate.  
The actions we dare to take . . . are what the story of risk is all about.”). 
 12.  See RENN, supra note 5, at 2-4 (discussing the debate about whether risks are 
socially constructed or real phenomena).  Where perceptions of risk are out of step with 
objective scientific evidence regarding the future probabilities and harms, a key component 
of risk management is to bring perceptions up to date.  That said,  
[a] vast majority of studies on risk perception and concerns tends to show, 
however, that most of the worries are not related to blatant errors or poor 
judgment, but to divergent views about the tolerability of remaining uncertainty, 
short-term versus long-term impacts, the trustworthiness of risk-regulating or 
risk-managing agencies, and the experience of inequity or injustice with regard 
to the distribution of benefits and risks. 
 Id. at 3. 
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isolated malfunctions; Product B, which generally functions reliably but is 
prone to a single, once-in-four-years large accident causing 150 deaths; and 
Product C, which will never malfunction but will produce latent 
carcinogenic effects on all users.  Here, the risk assessor has already 
completed the technical, probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of future 
state outcomes.  In order to conduct a discussion about the relative risks of 
Product A, Product B, and Product C, however, the risk assessor must 
familiarize himself with matters touching on human values.  He must 
consider, for example, whether the population prefers to take a risk that 
will result in the deaths of a few people regularly or a risk that will rarely, 
though reliably, result in the deaths of many people.  This process of risk 
assessment, which is different than risk management, consists of the 
following analytical steps:  (i) identifying future state outcomes that affect 
the values of the risk-assessing entity; (ii) formulating a way to measure or 
otherwise assess the possibilities of such outcomes; and (iii) aggregating 
different classes of outcomes and articulating their probabilities using 
language that permits comparison, priority-setting, and decision-making.
13
  
Task (i) describes the political-rhetorical dimension of risk.  Task (ii) 
relates to the causal environment linking future states to contingent events, 
and therefore describes the descriptive-relational dimension of risk.  Task 
(iii) bridges risk assessment with the distinct, but critically interdependent, 
challenge of risk control. 
Conceived of broadly, then, risk assessment includes the entire field of 
contingencies that affect matters of concern in recognizable ways.  Thus 
defined, a comprehensive program of risk assessment and management 
would require considering the likelihood of all possible future world states 
that might affect outcomes of interest to the assessor.
14
  Once risks are 
assessed, questions of risk management arise concerning allocations of 
organizational responsibility and design of information systems for 
assuring risk control and monitoring consistent with risk tolerance levels.
15
  
This new notion of management of risk necessarily entails control over the 
 
 13.  Accomplishments and Challenges, supra note 5, at 51. 
 14.  See Jerome R. Ravetz, Public Perceptions of Acceptable Risks as Evidence for the 
Cognitive, Technical, and Social Structure, in TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 45, 47 (Rob Coppock 
et al. eds. 1980) (“The hope that one can produce a taxonomy, evaluation, and finally a 
technical fix to the problems of risks is in substance as ambitious as the program of putting 
all of human experience and value onto a scale of measurement for mathematical or political 
manipulation.”). 
 15.  See Bridget M. Hutter & Michael Power, Organizational Encounters with Risk: An 
Introduction, in ORGANIZATIONAL ENCOUNTERS WITH RISK 1 (Bridget M. Hutter & Michael 
Power eds., 2005) (arguing that organizations are the principal actors in a risk society); M. 
Granger Morgan, Choosing and Managing Technology-Induced Risk, in READINGS IN RISK 
17, 17 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds., 1990) (setting forth questions 
addressing methods to assess, abate, and manage risk). 
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risk objects identified during the assessment phase.  A key component of 
any program of risk management is to maximize the range of risk objects 
that the manager has control over and to minimize the areas where the 
descriptive-relational link between contingency and future states remains 
hidden.
16
  An organization will succeed in managing risk to the extent that 
it is able to improve its risk assessment capabilities and maximize the range 
of risk objects over which it exerts control.  Therefore, control, or at least 
the perception of control, is central to risk management. 
Risk managers, particularly those working at financial institutions, 
might object to this characterization as too abstract and distant from their 
daily practice.  Although this is partly true, these broad definitions of risk 
and risk management still provide a useful framework in which actual risk 
management practice and regulation can be set.  By adopting this 
framework, it will be possible to question “the obviousness of practitioner 
common sense” by individuating “the processes by which that common 
sense was formed.”
17
  Financial risk is often conflated with volatility 
alone,
18
 but that approach unrealistically assumes static organizational 
goals and causal environments.  The success of the dominant quantitative 
model of risk management practice in recent decades is equivocal, so by 
starting with first principles it might be possible to contemplate alternative 
modes of control that could have proven more effective at risk assessment 
and control. 
Since the mid-1980s, commercial and regulatory developments have 
combined to elevate risk management (including risk assessment) to 
become a core management imperative in financial services.  Of course, the 
discipline of managing uncertainty is hardly a novel moment in intellectual 
history.  Probabilistic techniques for computing gambling odds developed 
in sixteenth century Italy, for example, would qualify as proto-risk 
management practices according to the broad framework outlined above.
19
  
So too would the events marking the genesis of dedicated insurance 
 
 16.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 197. 
 17.  MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 8 (1997). 
 18.  The idea that risk refers only to the quantifiable volatility of returns originated with 
Frank Knight in 1921.  See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (1921) 
(“To preserve the distinction . . . between the measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable 
one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the term ‘uncertainty’ for the 
latter.”).  For a discussion on why this view is unduly restrictive, see Glyn A. Holton, 
Defining Risk, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 20 (2004) (“According to common usage, risk 
entails both uncertainty and exposure—possible consequences.  Knight’s distinction 
addresses only the uncertainty.”); Robert F. Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented 
Stress Testing Regulation (manuscript on file with author). 
 19.  See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK 
MANAGER 22-24 (2002) (discussing studies of gambling by Girolamo Cardano, an Italian 
mathematician and physician). 
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markets, including Edmund Halley’s publication of mortality data in 1693 
for the purpose of accurate pricing of annuity contracts; the birth of a 
casualty insurance market at Edward Lloyd’s coffee house in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and the formation of the first 
life insurance companies in mid-eighteenth century Scotland.
20
  These 
insurance innovations were enabled by advances in statistical science 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that prompted confident 
assertions that human intelligence would soon be able to understand the 
entire universe in terms of cause and effect.
21
  Peter Bernstein has described 
the work of early statisticians Jacob Bernoulli, Abraham de Moivre, and 
Thomas Bayes as an “audacious” and “bold attack on the unknown.”
22
  
Even as the Enlightenment’s expectations that science would uncover all 
causal linkages gave way to the twentieth century’s recognition of the 
irreducible complexities of phenomena, probability theory emerged 
unscathed.
23
 
Despite its historical pedigree, risk management in its contemporary 
iterations seems novel due to its emergence as a subject for law and 
 
 20.  See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
WORLD 191-96 (2008) (chronicling the development of Scottish insurance products using 
mortality projections); Edmund Halley, First Life Insurance Tables, in 3 THE WORLD OF 
MATHEMATICS 1437 (James R. Newman ed., 1956) [hereinafter WORLD OF MATHEMATICS 
VOLUME 3] (discussing the valuation of life insurance and annuity contracts using actuarial 
tables).  
 21.  See, e.g., Pierre Simon de Laplace, Concerning Probability, in 2 THE WORLD OF 
MATHEMATICS 1325, 1325-26 (James R. Newman ed., 1956) (arguing that all events are 
caused and can therefore be understood).  The intellectual foundation for such assertions 
was laid by Jacob Bernoulli’s proof of the “law of large numbers,” which “enabled [man] at 
least to ascertain a posteriori what we cannot determine a priori, that is, to ascertain it from 
the results observed in numerous similar instances.”  Jacob Bernoulli, The Law of Large 
Numbers, in WORLD OF MATHEMATICS VOLUME 3, supra note 20, at 1452, 1453.  Bernoulli’s 
theory assumed that “the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of an event in the future will follow 
the same pattern as was observed for like events in the past.”  Id.  Abraham de Moivre 
demonstrated how a set of random samples would distribute themselves around an average 
value, thereby transforming Bernoulli’s assumption into a foundational premise of modern 
statistics.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 127-28.  Samples, whether from past data or from 
some other larger population, could be used to represent the true universe of possibilities.  
See id. at 126 (describing the use of a small sample to generalize about life expectancies).  
De Moivre trumpeted the confidence of this nascent statistical science:  “‘altho’ Chance 
produces irregularities, still the Odds will be infinitely great, that in process of Time, those 
Irregularities will bear no proportion to the recurrency of that Order which naturally 
results . . . .’”  ANDERS HALD, A HISTORY OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS AND THEIR 
APPLICATIONS BEFORE 1750 490-91 (2003) (quoting de Moivre from 1738).  
 22.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 133. 
 23.  See, e.g., Henri Poincaré, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE, in 1 SCIENCE AND 
EDUCATION: A SERIES OF VOLUMES FOR THE PROMOTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATION PROGRESS 395 (J. McKeen Cattell ed., 1921) (discussing probability at the turn 
of the twentieth century). 
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regulation, as well as its formalization and systemization within corporate 
and other organizational networks of authority and information.  In both 
government and in industry, “risk management has become more important 
than ever before.”
24
  One commentator has gone so far as to call risk 
management a “new religion.”
25
  Another refers to the “explosion” of risk 
management.
26
  Still others describe risk management as a “key business 
competence”
27
 or “the new strategic imperative in financial management.”
28
 
The proliferation of risk management norms and regulation in recent 
decades can be explained according to two alternative stories.  According 
to one story, referred to here as the traditional story of risk management, 
risk management and risk management regulation are seen as functional, 
practical responses to the challenge of managing in an increasingly volatile 
operating environment.
29
  The other story, referred to here as the alternative 
story of risk management, is more skeptical and, though it acknowledges 
the empirical fact of risk management as an enhanced organizational 
priority, it interrogates risk management’s normative assumptions.  When 
considering these contrasting stories, important points of divergence 
emerge.  Whether one looks optimistically to risk management and its 
regulation as a managerial practice will depend on which story one finds 
more convincing.  The traditional story portrays risk management as a 
tractable set of practices that generate information from the political-
rhetorical and descriptive-relational dimensions of risk and apply that 
information to promote organizational objectives.  The alternative story, by 
contrast, exposes problematic assumptions with the implementation of risk 
management into corporate governance infrastructure. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL STORY:  RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATION 
AS TOOL FOR MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL UNCERTAINTY 
Among bankers and regulators, a dominant narrative describes banks 
entering a new, riskier operating environment starting in the 1980s.  In 
response, bank regulators pursued their statutory missions—promoting the 
safety and soundness of individual institutions and system-wide financial 
 
 24.  James Lam, Managing Risk Across the Enterprise: Challenges and Benefits, in 
RISK MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Michael K. Ong ed., 2006). 
 25.  Bernstein, supra note 1, at 47. 
 26.  MICHAEL POWER, THE RISK MANAGEMENT OF EVERYTHING 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/riskmanagementofeverything.pdf. 
 27.  SATYAJIT DAS, RISK MANAGEMENT 4 (3d ed. 2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 28.  JAMES T. GLEASON, RISK: THE NEW MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVE IN FINANCE xvii 
(2000).  
 29.  See, e.g., POWER, supra note 26, at 37-38 (describing the new risk management 
approach as a “rational response” to today’s “more risky” environment). 
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stability—by harnessing advances in risk management systems being 
developed by the banks themselves.  According to this account, regulators 
intervened intermittently into corporate governance by imposing new risk 
management responsibilities on banks, often highlighting the best practices 
of forward-thinking institutions.  As market structures and activities 
evolved and new manifestations of risk materialized—including most 
prominently with respect to interest rate risk, market risk, credit risk, and 
operational risk—regulators responded by requiring banks to update their 
risk management systems to control the threats posed by such risks.  This 
traditional story depicts a logic of control characterized by a dynamic game  
of threat identification and response.  This story can be traced throughout 
the 1980s into the 2000s in the bank regulatory actions discussed below. 
The increasing emphasis by regulators on shaping internal risk 
management norms recalls what Cary Coglianese and David Lazer label 
management-based regulation (MBR).  MBR describes the process by 
which public administrators direct regulated organizations to engage in a 
planning process that aims to achieve public goals, while offering industry 
flexibility concerning the operational details for the achievement of those 
goals.
30
  The authors argue that MBR is appropriate where regulated 
entities are heterogeneous and regulatory outputs are difficult to monitor.
31
  
Regulated institutions with heterogeneous circumstances are not 
appropriate candidates for what the authors call “technology-based”
32
 
regulatory approaches; such approaches specify techniques, procedures, 
restrictions to be used in regulation, and are commonly referred to as 
command-and-control regulations.
33
  The use of rigid “[t]op-down, control-
oriented logic is ill-suited to the dynamism of risk in a knowledge society, 
which resists containment and instead demands active management.”
34
  
Conversely, where critical external outputs are difficult to monitor, 
“performance-based” regulatory regimes designed to intervene at the 
output stage (the classic example being pollution taxes set at the optimal 
amount required to offset the incentive to pollute
35
) are unlikely to result in 
 
 30.  See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & POL’Y 691, 693-96 (2003) 
(describing the goals of MBR, as well as its criteria, advantages, and implementation). 
31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 701. 
 33.  Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 
656-63 (2012). 
 34.  Susan V. Scott & Geoff Walsham, Reconceptualizing and Managing Reputation 
Risk in the Knowledge Economy: Toward Reputable Action, 16 ORG. SCI. 308, 310 (2005). 
 35.  See Martin Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUDIES 477, 477 
(1974) (discussing the debate between controlling pollution through emissions standards or 
taxes). 
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efficient administration.
36
   
Exploration with MBR approaches in the banking sector is hardly 
surprising.  With its institution-specific, idiosyncratic, and hard-to-monitor 
risk profiles, the banking industry is a natural candidate for regulation.  By 
influencing the way in which risk is conceived, deliberated, and acted on 
within a bank, regulators could preserve context-specificity and 
simultaneously elude the thorny epistemic problem of how to monitor 
excessive risk on an ongoing basis.  Regulators adopting an MBR approach 
would intervene at the planning stage, helping and overseeing the regulated 
institution as it deliberates on how to promote regulatory objectives.
37
 
Whether regulators have had success in their MBR approaches is 
discussed below, but the Coglianese-Lazer model provides a useful lens 
through which to consider risk management as a subject of bank regulation.  
Other regulatory scholars have developed similar notions, such as “meta 
risk management,”
38
 “meta-monitoring,”
39
 “meta-regulation,”
40
 “directly 
deliberative polyarchy,”
41
 and “responsive regulation.”
42
  These models of 
regulation aim to reorient regulatory practice in light of the limits of state 
power to regulate in decentralized, dynamic, volatile, and at times even 
authentically complex,
43
 realms of human activity.  They are characterized, 
somewhat counter-intuitively, both by the devolution of discretion to 
industry and enhanced pretensions of control.  Regulation works on the 
systems and procedures through which corporate authority results in 
corporate activity.  Regulators use public power to “push control further 
into organizational structures, inscribing it within systems which can then 
 
 36.  Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 30, at 701-02. 
 37.  Id. at 694, 706. 
 38.  John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax 
System Integrity, 25 LAW & POL’Y 1, 1 (2003) (“Meta risk management is a promising 
strategy when risks are volatile and difficult for the regulator to comprehend when the risks 
are effectively under the control of an organization over which the regulator has leverage.”). 
 39.  Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory 
Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y & ADMIN. 527, 543 (1995). 
 40.  CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 
15 (2002). 
 41.  Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 42.  See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 1 (1992) 
(introducing responsive regulation and distinguishing it from other regulation strategies 
“both in what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be”); see 
also Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L. REV. 59, 69 
(2008) (advocating a responsive regulation that responds “not merely to firms’ compliance 
responses but also to their attitudinal settings[,] to the broader institutional environment of 
the regulatory regime”). 
 43.  On the complexity of contemporary financial markets, see Robert F. Weber, 
Structural Regulation as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 643 (2012). 
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be audited.”
44
  The traditional story relies on these models of regulation and 
their sequential logic of threat perception and flexible regulatory response. 
A. The Risk Management Revolution and the Derivatives Revolution 
The traditional story must begin, for both conceptual and historical 
reasons, with an overview of the derivatives revolution that commenced in 
the 1980s.
45
  A derivative is a financial contract whose value depends on 
the values of one or more underlying assets, indexes, or reference rates.
46
  
Although some derivatives can be extremely complicated, all of them can 
be divided into two broad categories: options and forward contracts.
47
  
Derivatives are either standardized contracts executed on exchanges (i.e., 
“exchange-traded”) or custom-tailored, negotiated transactions (i.e., over-
the counter, or “OTC”).
48
 
Though many factors are responsible for fueling the derivatives boom, 
one principal motivating force was the need to hedge against an 
increasingly risky business environment.
49
  The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of managed exchange rates in the early 1970s augured a 
secular shift in the risk profile of the banking business.  This, along with 
other threats to financial markets during the 1960s and 1970s, led banks to 
hedge against these risks by creating a “new breed of securities,” including 
currency futures and options and interest rate swaps.
50
  
 
 44.  POWER, supra note 17, at 42. 
 45.  The opening paragraph of the introduction to a text on financial risk management 
illustrates the centrality of derivatives:  “The development of derivative instruments has 
emerged as perhaps the most significant aspect of capital markets in the last 20 years.  
Exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives have radically altered the practice of 
borrowing, investment and risk management.”  DAS, supra note 27, at ix.  Moreover, the 
author notes, “[t]he increased emphasis on risk management has seen a parallel process of 
establishing a series of practice benchmarks.  The central driver was the growth in 
derivatives activity.”  Id. at 12. 
 46.  GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 26 (1993) [hereinafter 
PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES]. 
 47.  Id. at 27; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT 
GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES 2 (1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf 
[hereinafter BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES]. 
 48.  PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46. 
 49.  Other uses of derivatives unrelated to risk reduction include lowering funding 
costs, diversifying funding sources, and enhancing returns by exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities.  Id. at 26, 32-40. 
 50.  MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT xix (2001); see also RAFFAELE 
SCALCIONE, THE DERIVATIVES REVOLUTION 18 (2010) (recommending four steps to 
strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives); GLEASON, supra note 28, at 28 
(discussing tools and techniques used to measure and manage hedging risks).  Other 
accounts trace the genesis of modern currency and interest rate swaps to back-to-back loan 
transactions, which were popularized in the 1970s for avoiding capital controls rather than 
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Furthermore, the deregulatory climate of the 1970s and 1980s opened 
up inter-sectoral competition among banks, securities firms, insurance 
companies, and mutual funds.  The Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), which 
has supervisory responsibility over bank holding companies, permitted 
banks to establish affiliates to underwrite and deal in securities otherwise 
off-limits to the banks themselves, including equities and bonds.  As a 
result of these activities, banks became subject to heightened market risk—
that is, the risk that the market price of an asset or liability may change 
over a given time period because of economic changes or other events.
51
  
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the lead regulator of the largest U.S. banks, gradually and 
deliberately empowered banks to become dealers in OTC derivatives.
52
  
Though the expansive definition of “commodity” in the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) could be read to subject many OTC derivatives to 
federal regulation, Congress and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) accepted the banks’ position that privately-negotiated 
OTC derivatives should be unregulated.
53
  The market expanded from 
 
hedging and risk management purposes.  JOHN F. MARSHALL & KENNETH R. KAPNER, 
UNDERSTANDING SWAPS 2-5 (1993).  Such discussions acknowledge, however, that 
whatever the precedent model transactions that gave rise to early swaps, the foreign 
exchange and interest rate volatility of the 1980s caused the market to grow rapidly.  Id. at 
6. 
 51.  Jorge R. Sobehart & Sean C. Keenan, New Challenges in Credit Risk Modeling and 
Measurement, in RISK MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 203, 208. 
 52.  Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the 
“Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009). 
 53.  See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983, 
42,985 (Oct. 23, 1985) (discussing the various types of instruments that will remain 
unregulated); Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (Jul. 1, 
1989) (providing a safe harbor from CFTC regulation for OTC swap transactions meeting 
specified requirements).  Banks were unsatisfied by the CFTC’s 1989 policy statement, 
perceiving in it a latent legal risk that the CFTC could later withhold the safe harbor, and 
therefore lobbied in favor of a comprehensive statutory exemption.  The banks’ confusion 
stemmed from the seeming incongruence between the 1989 policy statement and the so-
called Treasury Amendment to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 
which exempted OTC “trading in foreign currency,” among other transactions, from the 
CEA altogether.  50 Fed. Reg. 42,985; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMODITY 
EXCHANGE ACT: ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS 8 
(2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/229069.pdf (noting that the Treasury 
Amendment operated on the assumption that bank regulators, rather than the SEC or CFTC, 
would supervise OTC derivatives markets); GORDON F. PEERY, THE POST-REFORM GUIDE TO 
DERIVATIVES AND FUTURES 272 (2012) (noting the conflicting interpretations).  The 
Treasury Amendment was proposed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in recognition 
of the prevalence of financially knowledgeable institutional investors in the foreign 
exchange futures markets.  See Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. 
Reg. at 42,983-85 (Oct. 23, 1985) (CFTC) (distinguishing sales to the general public from 
those made to institutional investors).  In October 1992, Congress provided the CFTC with 
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“vanilla” interest rate and currency swaps to “derivatives linked to credit 
risk, currency convertibility risk, equity risk, macro-economic indicia 
(including inflation and unemployment rates), market access risk, and 
volatility and weather risk, as well as derivatives replicating both real estate 
investments and the dynamic portfolios of securities and derivatives.”
54
  A 
wave of consolidation in the banking industry, coupled with the increased 
diversification into other business lines, created financial institutions that 
were larger in asset size and wider in scope than ever before.  With size 
came new operational risks, as business units became subject to risk of 
automated systems failures and human errors or frauds across a wider array 
of affiliated businesses.
55
 
But the derivatives revolution carried with it a paradox:  the increases 
in the number and trading volume of new derivatives instruments remedied 
existing risks while they created new ones.  This paradox is best understood 
by comparing the view of derivatives from a portfolio-specific perspective 
to an institution-wide perspective.  Banks and other businesses found 
themselves facing new manifestations of credit, market, interest rate, 
liquidity, and operational risks.  Derivatives allowed them to hedge their 
exposures.
56
  Derivatives are, like insurance, inherently capable of 
functioning as risk reduction instruments; they are contracts between a 
party that is paid to assume certain risks and a counterparty that buys 
protection against that risk.
57
  A summary of risk management in The 
Oxford Handbook of Banking defines risk management as the discipline of 
offsetting exposures through the use of derivatives.
58
  Such a definition is 
 
authority to exempt certain classes of OTC derivatives from regulation under the CEA.  
Futures Trading Practices Act, Pub. L. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992) (repealed 2000).  The 
Act also invoked federal preemption to exempt most OTC derivative transactions from the 
scope of state anti-gambling laws, which facially seemed to prohibit such transactions.  
Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial 
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1654-55 (2008).  Three months later, the 
CFTC exempted OTC swaps from the CEA.  Exemption of Certain Swap Agreements, 58 
Fed. Reg. 5587 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (2012)).   
 54.  Paul Ali, Corporate Governance and Derivatives End Users, in PRACTICAL 
DERIVATIVES 9, 9 (Carolyn Boyle et al. eds., 2d ed., 2010). 
 55.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has provided a very general but 
influential definition of operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.”  BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND 
CAPITAL STANDARDS 144 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm 
[hereinafter BASEL II FRAMEWORK]. 
 56.  See Linda Allen & Anthony Saunders, Risk Management in Banking, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 99 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2010) (describing 
derivative markets as “the thermostat used by the bank to control its risk temperature”). 
 57.  See PEERY, supra note 53, at 3 (comparing derivatives to insurance contracts). 
 58.  Allen & Saunders, supra note 56, at 90. 
WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:53 PM 
2013] THE LAW AND REGULATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT 1021 
 
too narrow, but it underscores the centrality of derivatives to any account of 
the heightened concern for risk management.  From a portfolio-specific 
perspective, then, a derivative transforms a given risk exposure for the 
portfolio into a credit risk exposure against the derivative counterparty.  
Where that credit exposure is less risky than the risk against that which the 
derivative protects—which is nearly always the case—the derivative 
reduces the total amount of risk faced by the exposed entity.
59
 
Unlike insurance purchasers, however, which are only empowered to 
obtain insurance against exposures in which they possess an insurable 
interest, an OTC derivatives trader is unrestrained as a contractual matter in 
the amount of exposure it can create.
60
  The derivatives trader’s only 
constraints are the ingenuity of parties drafting derivatives contracts and 
the continued willingness of counterparties to accept the terms of the 
contract.  Thus, there is theoretically no limit to the amounts of exposure a 
bank can create, either entrepreneurially or unwittingly.
61
  
In the early years of OTC derivatives, banks acted as brokers between 
two counterparties desiring to take opposite sides of a trade.
62
   But banks 
gradually began acting as parties in the transactions, developing their own 
portfolios of derivatives.  The accumulation of proprietary positions in 
derivatives required dealer banks to confront a new challenge:  how to 
manage the net risk of its overall position.  As a result of the transition 
from brokering transactions to maintaining portfolios, trade volume 
skyrocketed and the dimensionality of institution-specific risk increased by 
orders of magnitude.
63
  Regulators such as Alan Greenspan, then Chairman 
 
 59.  For this statement to be true in all circumstances, we would also need to verify that 
the bank was not, by accepting a credit exposure, incurring other unforeseen exposures.  See 
JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 55-76 (2007) (describing 
how traders hedge risk exposures with derivatives). 
 60.  Absent an insurable interest on the part of the insured, an insurance contract is void 
as a wagering contract.  See LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 
41:1 (3d ed. 2009) (defining insurable interest).  Conversely, a derivatives dealer, 
unencumbered by the insurable interest requirement, faces no limits, at least as a matter of 
contract and insurance law, in its ability to wager. 
 61.  In the case of an option contract, which is a basic type of derivative, the writer of a 
single option is exposed to the possibility of (a theoretic) unlimited loss if its exposure 
remains un-hedged.  See BASEL COMM. BANKING SUPERVISION, THE MANAGEMENT OF 
BANKS’ OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES 5 (1986), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc134.pdf [hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET 
EXPOSURES]. 
 62.  See PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 39-40 (discussing the financial 
goals motivating trades for each party).  For example, Party A might want to hedge against 
fuel price inflation and Party B might want to speculate that fuel prices will decrease.  Party 
A and Party B would then contact Bank, a known derivatives dealer, who would match 
Party A and Party B and document the trade for a fee.  
 63.  By 1996, derivatives had evolved from obscure risk management devices to 
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of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, viewed the 
expansion in trading volumes of derivatives with equanimity, convinced 
that banks were incurring new exposures precisely because of an enhanced 
ability to manage risk.
64
 
Other regulators were less confident.  While the Basel Committee 
recognized that the “basic risks associated with derivatives transactions are 
not new to banking organizations[,]”
65
 it remained mindful that the basic 
risks could be “repackage[d] . . . in combinations that can be quite 
complex,” in the process “threaten[ing] the safety and soundness of 
institutions if they are not clearly understood and properly managed.”
66
  By 
the mid-1990s, however, regulators began to recognize problems deeper 
than the institution-specific safety and soundness concerns.  In particular, 
the failure of a single large derivatives dealer could “cause liquidity 
problems in the markets and could also pose risks to others, including 
federally insured banks and the financial system as a whole.”
67
  In the 
words of a Bank for International Settlements official in 1995, the 
vulnerability of banks had increased markedly, requiring regulators “to 
anticipate new sources of change,” while at the same time recognizing that 
they “will not always be successful.”
68
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. lawmakers, courts, and regulators 
sought to preserve the productive advantages of the new generation of 
derivative instruments and other financial innovations, while at the same 
time indirectly encouraging the use of risk management techniques among 
financial institutions dealing in derivatives markets.  The new risk 
 
comprise a market twice the size of the U.S. stock market and more than ten times the total 
U.S. sovereign debt.  FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O. STREET 15 (1997). 
 64.  See Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & Fin. of the U.S. H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 103d Cong. 26 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of the 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/805/download/27981/Greenspan-19940525.pdf (“It 
is important to recognize that significant advances in the management of market and credit 
risks, including improvements both in financial methodology and in the design of 
management information systems, lie behind the recent surge in derivatives activity.”). 
 65.  BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 3.  See PRACTICES AND 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 2 (“Derivatives help to manage risk in new ways—an 
important economic function.  Yet the risks involved in derivatives activities are neither new 
nor unique.  They are the same kinds of risks found in traditional financial products:  
market, credit, legal, and operational risks.”). 
 66.  BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 3 . 
 67.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 7 (1994), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/154342.pdf [hereinafter GAO DERIVATIVES REPORT]. 
 68.  Andrew Crockett, Speech Before the Swiss Bankers Association, Sept. 27, 1995 
in  DMITRIS CHORAFAS, RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 9 (2007). 
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environment changed the nature of the banking business and regulation.  
As described by FRB Governor Dan Tarullo: 
 Gone were the days when a bank CEO had a hands-on sense 
of the risks entailed in even a large bank’s significant 
operations—mortgage, consumer, corporate, etc.  With the 
growth in off-balance-sheet activities [such as derivatives], the 
explosion of creative securitization and other financial 
innovations, and the erosion of barriers between commercial 
banking and other financial activities, even the most diligent 
senior management was inevitably unaware of the nature and 
scope of at least some significant risks.
69
 
This “inevitable unawareness” of bank management—along with the 
concomitant recognition that regulators were even further removed from 
meaningful risk awareness—motivated regulators to think creatively about 
facilitating solutions to the challenge of managing uncertainty. 
Crucially, however, regulators stopped short of expressly prescribing 
the content that risk management obligations entail, instead preferring that 
the industry develop its own risk management practices and infrastructure.  
This phenomenon is not limited to finance.  Public law authorities have 
made broad-based risk management interventions into the corporate 
governance of non-financial firms as well.  These efforts in the non-
financial context have consisted predominantly of requiring firms to 
monitor internal controls over financial reporting and legal compliance—a 
narrow, compliance-oriented risk management.  These internal control 
measures constitute a subset of risk management relating to legal and 
accounting risks that form part of the broader constellation of risk 
management tools.
70
  In recognition of the potential risks of instability 
inherent in derivatives markets, legislative and regulatory initiatives in the 
financial arena have gone beyond compliance-oriented risk management to 
foster a broad, comprehensive risk management, through the use of express 
directives to constitute—and over time, reinforce—a risk management 
function within the firm that is responsible for assessing all risks. 
B. Origins of Risk-Management as Compliance-Oriented Internal 
Control 
This article focuses on risk management systems at financial 
institutions.  Though the derivatives discussion above highlights why risk 
 
 69.  DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 175 (2008). 
 70.  See OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (warning that 
internal controls are insufficient to cover the entire range of enterprise risk management).   
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management became a new managerial imperative in the finance industry 
in the 1980s and 1990s, risk management attracted the attention of 
lawmakers, courts, and regulators in other contexts as well.  During the 
same period, public law authorities perceived that the task of managing 
large-scale, often multinational, enterprises required new organizational 
responses to risks.
71
  These authorities responded by intervening into 
corporate governance, usually by addressing the adequacy of internal 
controls over financial reporting and legal compliance rather than risk 
itself.  Internal controls are those processes designed to ensure that an 
organization has in place an organizational behavior corresponding to a 
particular risk and a control to ensure that the behavior is both being 
applied and working as intended.
72
  A system of internal controls, if 
designed effectively, can provide reasonable assurance that an organization 
performs reliably, in accordance with its policies, and in pursuit of its 
objectives.
73
  The concept of compliance—i.e., with laws, with accounting 
rules, or more broadly, with firm-wide organizational policies or 
objectives—is at the heart of internal control systems.
74
  In recognition of 
the heterogeneity of organizational settings, these legal authorities have 
generally left the operationalization and elaboration of internal controls to 
industry itself, stopping short of expressly prescribing any particular 
format.  As applied to banks, these legal responses operated as a sort of 
background, default mandatory regime governing the monitoring and 
control of a class of uncertain events, and also as a comparison point for the 
more expansive systems of risk control, to be discussed later in Sub-Parts 
II.C and II.D, that regulators imposed on banks. 
Judicial intervention in this area has taken the form of an expansive 
gloss on the common law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
75
  A basic 
 
 71.  See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and 
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 571 (2008) (highlighting some of the risks 
faced by large multinational enterprises). 
 72.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 17 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf. 
 73.  See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,324, 35,336 (Jun. 27, 2007) (discussing internal controls); see 
also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL 
SYSTEMS IN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1998), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs40.pdf (emphasizing the importance of internal controls for a 
bank). 
 74.  See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. R. 487 (2003) (summarizing and skeptically 
assessing the legal treatment of the compliance function). 
 75.  Whether the failure-to-monitor claim alleges a breach of the duty of loyalty or the 
duty of care does not impact the application of the business judgment rule, though if the 
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precept of corporate law is that a board of directors has the primary 
responsibility for overseeing the business and affairs of a corporation.
76
  In 
exercising this responsibility, the board is subject to a duty of loyalty and a 
duty of care.
77
  During the past two decades, courts, perhaps due in part to 
the increasing complexity of firm-specific risk profiles, have interpreted 
these duties to include a responsibility to ensure that a firm has adequate 
monitoring and reporting systems, though they have stopped short of 
expressly requiring any particular form of risk management system.  For 
example, the Delaware Chancery Court famously stated in In re Caremark 
International Derivative Litigation that a corporate board of directors’ 
duties include ensuring that an adequate “corporate information and 
reporting system” is in place to provide management with “timely, accurate 
information.”
78
  Ten years later, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized in 
Stone v. Ritter the validity of a Caremark failure-to-monitor claim, but 
limited the scope of the claim to instances where the board demonstrates a 
“conscious disregard” for its duty to provide for a corporate information 
infrastructure.
79
  Only where a board of directors “utterly fail[s] to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls” will a violation 
of the duty of care be found.
80
  Both Caremark and Stone focused on the 
critical role that information flow plays in reducing the risk of unlawful 
activity—a risk for which minimal, if not zero, tolerance is given.
81
 
 
claim is framed as a breach of the former duty, the defendant directors will not be able to 
avail themselves of a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 967, 975 (2009) 
(discussing the care executives must take in their duties to monitor). 
 76.  See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2009) (“The business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of 
a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate 
of incorporation.”). 
 77.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (discussing the doctrinal 
boundaries of the board’s duties of loyalty and care). 
 78.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litg., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
Caremark was before the Chancery Court for judicial approval of a settlement agreed to by 
the parties, so the portions of Chancellor Allen’s opinion concerning the duty to monitor are 
technically dicta.  Nevertheless, the duty-to-monitor analysis has “morphed into what has 
come to be known as a Caremark claim” in both federal and state courts both within and 
outside of Delaware.  Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 64 BUS. LAW. 253, 
272 (2008). 
 79.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70.  In Caremark, Chancellor Allen warned that a failure-
to-monitor claim was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a 
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. In Stone, the Supreme 
Court quoted his observation approvingly.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 372. 
 80.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (emphasis added).   
 81.  Although risk management and legal compliance (including internal controls over 
financial reporting) are not different in kind, they are different in degree, inasmuch as 
boards are expected to establish some tolerance for risk taking (unlike law-breaking).  See 
WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:53 PM 
1026 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:4 
 
In 2008, plaintiffs brought a novel failure-to-monitor claim against 
Citigroup Inc., alleging that the board of directors failed to monitor and 
oversee risks associated with the housing market in the lead up to the most 
recent financial crisis.
82
  Plaintiffs did not, however, allege breaches of the 
law or financial statement inaccuracies.
83
  In this case, the Delaware 
Chancery Court refused to allow a Caremark claim against Citigroup 
directors to proceed.
84
  The Court observed that plaintiffs’ claims differed 
from traditional Caremark claims in that plaintiffs allegedly “fail[ed] to 
properly monitor Citigroup’s business risk, specifically its exposure to the 
subprime mortgage market.”
85
  The court emphasized the relevance of the 
business judgment rule—i.e., that good faith business decisions are not 
challengeable in court unless plaintiffs can prove a violation of the board’s 
duties of care and loyalty—even in the context of a Caremark-style failure-
to-monitor claim.  In the end, the plaintiffs did not plead with adequate 
specificity how the oversight mechanisms instated by the board to monitor 
business risk were inadequate.
86
  Plaintiffs’ case was no doubt handicapped 
by their acknowledgement that Citigroup had created an audit and risk 
management committee of the board that met twenty-three times through 
2006 and 2007.
87
  Notably, however, the Chancery Court clarified that 
oversight responsibilities described in Caremark were not limited to 
internal control over financial reporting and legal compliance, stating that 
“it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the [Caremark] burden under 
some [different] set of facts” in a suit alleging failure to monitor business 
risk.
88
  Though Citigroup applies some pressure on boards to oversee the 
implementation of risk management systems, the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s imposition of the “conscious disregard” requirement in Stone 
seems to afford a board wide discretion. 
Congress and regulators also focused on internal controls during this 
period in the banking industry and elsewhere.  Such efforts adopt a 
management-based regulatory model under which the abstract systems of 
internal control over risks, rather than the risk outputs themselves, became 
the regulated subject.
89
  Though the external audit as a mode of assurance 
 
Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 982-84. 
 82.  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
     83.    Id. 
 84.  Id. at 112. 
 85.  Id. at 123. 
 86.  Id. at 128. 
 87.  Id. at 127. 
 88.  Id. at 126. 
 89.  See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (explaining the features of 
management-based regulation). 
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provision had been around for centuries,
90
 a heightened emphasis on 
internal control represented a new control logic that focused on the system 
rather than the reliability of individual acts.
91
  Internal controls assumed 
increasing importance in the accounting profession as businesses became 
more complicated, particularly with international expansion.
92
  Businesses 
with strong internal controls over accounting would require a lower degree 
of external verification for their accounts. 
The first public law foray into internal control dates to the mid-1970s 
when Congress, responding to a series of corporate bribery scandals, 
enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
93
  The FCPA aimed to 
redress a new perceived threat:  bribery and corruption by U.S. firms with 
global operations.  Recognizing that Congress lacked the expertise to 
prescribe standards for how to organize control over firm assets and that 
U.S. regulators lacked the enforcement resources to police business units in 
far-flung corners of a globalized economy, the FCPA requires firms, 
among other things, to have in place “a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that access to and use 
of corporate assets occur only with proper authorization and that 
transactions are properly recorded.
94
 
Congress took the internal controls mandate a step further in the 
banking context by requiring specific attestations from management.  
Following the savings and loan debacle of the late 1980s, Congress enacted 
a sweeping reform of federal banking regulation with the Federal Deposit 
 
 90.  See, e.g., DEREK MATTHEWS, A HISTORY OF AUDITING: THE CHANGING AUDIT 
PROCESS IN BRITAIN FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY 6 (2006) 
(recounting how landlords in Medieval Europe employed auditors to provide anti-fraud 
assurance with respect to stewards’ accounts). 
 91.  See POWER, supra note 17, at 20 (describing a shift to internal control testing by 
auditing practitioners in the 1930s); cf. id. at 88 (“Audits become possible in complex 
environments by abstracting from that complexity and by operating upon a systems surface 
which in some cases has been designed with auditability in mind.”).   
 92.  Michael Power ascribes the preference for internal control over direct audit in 
terms of cost reduction.  See id. at 82 (“Even though economic pressures may have driven 
auditors to reduce the volume of their transactions work, the idea of reliance on auditee 
controls is fundamentally plausible: if one can have confidence that a system exists to 
control the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions between an organization and 
its environment, then it is unnecessary to duplicate this work and look at the transactions in 
detail.”). 
 93.  See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 558-59 (6th ed. 2009) 
(discussing the scandals that preceded the FCPA’s enactment). 
 94.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006).  The FCPA also prohibited the making of most 
payments to foreign officials and their representatives for purposes of making or retaining 
business.  Id. § 78dd-1(a).  As such, the FCPA employs a hybrid regulatory approach 
utilizing MBR and PBR.  See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
those approaches. 
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Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).  Among other 
things, FDICIA required a bank’s CEO and chief accounting or financial 
officer to sign statements acknowledging their responsibility for 
“establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure” and 
maintaining compliance with regulations regarding the safety and 
soundness of their banks.
95
  The same executives also were required to 
attest to the effectiveness of the internal control environment.
96
  FDICIA 
also required federal bank regulators to establish certain safety and 
soundness standards for FDIC-insured banks, including with respect to 
internal controls and information systems.
97
  These standards would be 
evaluated during bank examinations. 
Shortly thereafter, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO),
98
 a consortium of the major accounting 
professional associations, published the first comprehensive guide to the 
internal control function.
99
  The non-binding COSO internal controls 
framework defined internal control as a “process, effected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement” of certain specified types 
of organizational objectives.
100
  Importantly, the framework identified not 
only the traditional internal control objects—i.e., compliance with law and 
financial reporting reliability—but also “effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations.”
101
  According to the COSO framework, a system of internal 
controls could be designed to promote any of an entity’s business 
objectives, “including performance and profitability goals and safeguarding 
of resources.”
102
  This marks a point of departure in the internal control 
literature and recalls the political-rhetorical dimension of risk.
103
  COSO 
addressed the descriptive-relational dimension of risk as well, including 
risk assessment and ongoing risk monitoring as two of the five pillars of a 
 
 95.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 36(b), Pub. L. 
102-242, 105 Stat. 2242 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(b)). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. § 39 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §1831p-1). 
 98.  The organizational name for the Treadway Commission was the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.  Founded in 1985 by COSO, it took its 
name from James C. Treadway, Jr., its initial chairman and former commissioner of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 99.  COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, INTERNAL CONTROL—
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992), available at http://www.coso.org/ic-integratedframework-
summary.htm [hereinafter COSO INTERNAL CONTROLS FRAMEWORK]. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of that dimension. 
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system of internal control.
104
  With the COSO framework, the internal 
controls discourse had evolved into an intellectual framework for risk 
identification, assessment, and monitoring, albeit manifested only in the 
private sector trade standards and not yet as a matter of public law in any 
meaningful sense.
105
 
Around the same time, a series of corporate scandals in the United 
Kingdom prompted the London Stock Exchange, the financial accounting 
firms, and the Financial Reporting Council, a U.K. regulator charged with 
promoting corporate governance and reporting norms, to establish a 
committee to make recommendations concerning financial aspects of 
corporate governance in the United Kingdom.  The committee published 
the “Cadbury Report,” which stressed that boards of directors “maintain a 
system of internal control over the financial management of the company” 
and recommended that boards “make a statement,” to be “report[ed] 
thereon” by external auditors, regarding the effectiveness of the firm’s 
internal controls.
106
  It was more modest than the COSO framework, likely 
because it carried the force of law.
107
  Seven years later, U.K. accounting 
authorities published the Turnbull Report, which provided guidance 
concerning the suggestions set forth in the Cadbury Report.
108
  The 
Turnbull Report highlights the conceptual inter-linkages between the 
management of compliance and information under the internal control 
rubric and risk management.
109
  Particular attention was paid to allocation 
of responsibility:  boards were to deliberate on risk tolerances, assessments, 
and limits; and management was responsible for designing, operating, and 
monitoring control systems that implement board policy.  The system of 
 
 104.  COSO Internal Controls Framework, supra note 100.  The other components 
included the control environment, control activities, and information-and-communication.  
Id.  
 105.  When bank regulators began to focus more extensively on risk management, the 
COSO internal controls framework became a reference point. 
 106.  REP. OF THE COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶¶ 4.31–
4.32 (1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf. 
 107.  The Cadbury Report recommendations were integrated into the U.K.’s corporate 
governance code, by which firms listed on the London Stock Exchange were bound.  By 
contrast, the COSO framework was designedly aspirational. 
 108.  The Cadbury Report was widely viewed as a portal through which risk 
management issues, more explicitly developed in the Turnbull Report, became part of 
enterprise control norms.  See Alnoor Bhimani, Risk Management, Corporate Governance 
and Management Accounting: Emerging Interdependencies, 20 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 2, 2 
(2009) (explaining that the Cadbury Report opened the door for enterprise control practices 
to include risk management). 
 109.  See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND & WALES, INTERNAL 
CONTROL: GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE ¶¶ 16-24 (1999), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/turnbul.pdf  (emphasizing the importance of reporting 
and information flow in its internal control objectives). 
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internal control should cover not only risk of non-compliance with law or 
unreliable financial reporting, but also such additional “significant 
business, operational, financial, compliance and other risks.”
110
  For this 
reason, the Turnbull Report has been described as “eviden[ce]” of the 
“COSO legacy” of risk-based internal control.
111
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to a series of 
large accounting scandals at major U.S. companies, imposed a FDICIA-
like mandate on all reporting companies subject to SEC periodic disclosure 
requirements.  Specifically, Congress required these firms in section 404 (i) 
to certify the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting
112
 
and (ii) to arrange for their auditor to attest to such certifications.
113
  
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted nearly ten years after the 
COSO internal controls framework had been published, its application to 
financial reporting alone, rather than risk more generally, limited its 
scope.
114
  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further required the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) to review and amend, as appropriate, the sentencing 
guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that the guidelines were 
“sufficient to deter and punish organizational criminal misconduct.”
115
  In 
performing that charge, the USSC amended the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines (OSG) in 2004 to provide for sentence reductions for defendant 
organizations that have implemented an “effective compliance and ethics 
program,”
116
 defined to incorporate board- and executive-level oversight, 
periodic re-assessment of legal risks, and communication to employees.
117
  
The 2004 OSG amendments expanded on a series of earlier 1991 OSG 
amendments that provided incentives for corporations to implement legal 
compliance programs.
118
 
 
 110.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 111.  POWER, supra note 26, at 26. 
 112.  15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2006). 
 113.  Id. § 7262(b). 
 114.  This is not to suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a whole was not significant.  
From the perspective of the senior executives and board members incurring potential civil 
and criminal liability in connection with their attestations concerning the effectiveness of 
internal controls over financial reporting, the Act effectuated a sea change in corporate 
governance.  In 2012, Congress exempted a large class of issuers, known as “emerging 
growth compan[ies,]” from the requirements of section 404. Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act, H.R. 3606, § 103 (2012). 
 115.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 802 
(2002). 
 116.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1) (2010). 
 117.  Id. § 8B2.1(b). 
 118.  See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model To Encourage 
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1134 n.125 (discussing amendments 
to the Sentencing Guidelines); Krawiec, supra note 74, at 497-98 (acknowledging that the 
OSG amendments, “[f]or all practical purposes, . . . require companies to adopt internal 
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C. Toward a Broader, More Comprehensive Risk Management 
This sub-Part explains how bank regulators have sought to fulfill their 
mandate to monitor and protect the safety and soundness of banks, as well 
as the stability of the financial sector, by encouraging banks to develop an 
internal risk management infrastructure.
119
  These regulatory 
pronouncements took the form of guidance provided to banks and their 
examiners to be taken into account during the bank examination process, as 
well as more general guidance concerning the definitions of what 
constitutes an unsafe or unsound banking practice.  The guidance would 
therefore serve as the basis for an enforcement action.  Regulators saw risk 
management as a managerial antidote designed to control the instabilities 
engendered by the dizzying changes in the business of banking.  In 
particular, regulators focused on the expansion of derivatives and securities 
activities, which they saw as requiring a new forward-looking risk 
management function beyond traditional internal control’s focus on reliable 
compliance.
120
  The previous sub-Part describes the process by which 
internal control, initially a technical and limited discipline designed to 
provide assurance with respect to legal compliance and financial reporting, 
began to be interpreted as a more comprehensive set of managerial 
responsibilities associated with risk control more generally.  Bank 
regulators proved themselves innovators during this period as they 
attempted to influence the norms and techniques by which banks managed 
potential exposures, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. 
By 2006, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Ben 
Bernanke would characterize “[regulators’] assessment of the quality of a 
bank’s procedures for evaluating, monitoring, and managing risk, and of 
the bank’s internal models for determining economic capital” as the “heart 
of the modern bank examination.”
121
  In 2008, Dan Tarullo noted that 
because the “risks associated with the complexity and pace of large bank 
activities cannot be effectively contained even with sophisticated rules . . . . 
the emphasis increasingly has been on fostering robust risk management 
systems within the banks themselves.”
122
  Where, in other words, a review 
 
compliance structures”). 
 119.  For a summary of bank regulatory responsibilities with respect to safety-and-
soundness and financial stability, see Weber, supra note 43, at 662-65. 
 120.  See Crockett, supra note 68, at xi (presenting risk management as the “management 
of change”).  Chorafas identifies technology, innovation, globalization, and deregulation as 
the predominant changes in financial services since the 1970s and 1980s.  Id. at 8. 
 121.  Bernanke Stonier School Remarks, supra note 2. 
 122.  TARULLO, supra note 69, at 274; see also Bank Holding Company Rating System, 
69 Fed. Reg. 70,444, 70,444 (Dec. 6, 2004) (“[A]s the banking industry has continued to 
evolve over the past decade, the focus of the Federal Reserve’s examination program for 
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of balance sheets and compliance with the law no longer assured a bank’s 
safety and soundness, the internal system of corporate operating practices 
and systems that could give rise to vulnerabilities emerged as a critical 
regulatory object.
123
  In 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), which is responsible for examining state banks that are not 
members of the Federal Reserve System, took account of this new 
institutional focus in its own organizational structure when it renamed its 
examination office the Division of Risk Management Supervision.
124
 
The discussion below chronicles the emergence and evolution of risk 
management as a legal-regulatory subject during the 1980s and 1990s.  A 
heightened awareness of financial risks, on account of rate volatility and 
“innovation” in derivatives markets, motivated bank regulators to adopt 
increasingly sweeping visions of risk management responsibilities of bank 
boards and managers.  Bank regulators communicated their vision by 
publishing a rapid succession of supervisory letters, circulars, policy 
statements, bulletins, as well as rules and regulations subject to full notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures.  As a result, the policy positions 
expressed in these regulatory pronouncements became part of the 
examination and rating process, as examiners would evaluate and discuss at 
length with bank management risk management practices in light of 
regulatory guidance.
125
 
 
bank holding companies has increasingly centered on a comprehensive review of financial 
risk and the adequacy of risk management.”); CROUHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 21 (writing 
in 2001 that “the role of regulators has begun to shift to that of monitoring sophisticated 
banks’ internal risk management systems”). 
 123.  See BD. GOVS. FED. RES. SYS., SR 95-51 (SUP), RATING THE ADEQUACY OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND INTERNAL CONTROLS AT STATE MEMBER BANKS AND BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES (1995), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1995/sr9551.htm [hereinafter FRB 
GUIDELINES FOR RATING RISK MANAGEMENT] (asserting that “specific rating of risk 
management and internal controls should be given significant weight when evaluating 
management under [specific risk] rating systems”). 
 124.  F.D.I.C., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 7, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2010annualreport/AR10final.pdf. 
 125.  U.S. bank supervisors subject large banks to a continuous supervision regime.  See, 
e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: LARGE 
BANK SUPERVISION 17-21 (2010) (explaining that examination of large banks involves a 
periodic core assessment that culminates in a report from the OCC to the bank’s board of 
directors as well as “various ongoing supervisory activities” and “targeted examinations”—
i.e., integrated risk assessments by business or product line).  Regulators usually rely on “the 
use of reason and moral suasion” as their “primary corrective tools.”  F.D.I.C., RISK 
MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 15.1 (2010).  The use of these soft 
persuasive tactics occurs under the shadow of bank regulators’ statutory powers (i) to order 
banks to remediate unsafe or unsound practices uncovered during examinations backed by 
specified and open-ended enforcement authority and (ii) to issue cease-and-desist orders 
with respect to unsafe or unsound practices. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b) & 1831 (2006).  The 
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A review of the selected regulatory actions analyzed below reveals 
three predominant stages of risk management regulation during this period:  
(i) responsibility allocation and internal risk control; (ii) threat description 
and control; and (iii) construction of a system of comprehensive enterprise 
protection.  The first stage included regulatory efforts to respond to the new 
operating environment by defining the roles of boards of directors, senior 
managers, and the newly formed risk management departments.  During 
the second stage, regulators heightened the particularity with which they 
treated risk, mandating specific procedures to plan for, monitor, assess, and 
manage risk, and describing how specific risk objects (e.g., credit risk, 
market risk, operational risk) should be controlled.  The third stage 
articulated the broadest and most encompassing form of risk management 
regulation—a regulatory approach that conceived of risk management as an 
enterprise-wide program comprehending all exposures and their 
interconnections. 
The stages are more thematic than strictly chronological, though a 
rough chronological order is evident, with the first stage dominating early 
phases of policy and giving way to the second stage and, eventually, the 
third stage in later phases.  Two additional clarifications are in order.  First, 
these descriptions are not comprehensive and are meant only to provide a 
broad overview of the general trends and approaches in the regulation of 
risk management practices, in particular how regulators saw them as a 
potential solution to problems posed by new market realities.  Second, 
regulatory action pursuant to these themes was most often accretive and not 
substitutive, meaning that regulators periodically would add to the scope of 
risk management guidance without paring back previous obligations.  One 
counter-intuitive aspect of this story is that as regulators expanded the 
scope of objects that banks would be required to control, their guidance 
became more demanding about the precision with which those objects 
would be controlled.  The regulatory guidance gradually became 
characterized by an increasing degree of what Harvard Business School 
 
FDIC has special authority to terminate deposit insurance for banks engaged in unsafe or 
unsound practices.  § 1818(a)(2).  The regulatory guidance concerning risk management 
thus provides a jurisdictional hook for regulators to jawbone bank management or, where 
appropriate, take corrective action.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2000-16, RISK MODELING 8 (2000) [hereinafter OCC MODEL 
VALIDATION GUIDANCE], available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/resources/3676/occ-
bl2000-16_risk_model_validation.pdf (“[U]sing unvalidated models to manage risks to the 
bank is potentially an unsafe and unsound practice.”); FRB GUIDELINES FOR RATING RISK 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 123, at 4 (“An institution’s failure to establish a management 
structure that adequately identifies, measures, monitors, and controls the risks involved in its 
various products and lines of business has long been considered unsafe and unsound 
conduct.”). 
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Professor Anette Mikes has labeled “quantitative enthusiasm”:  a 
preference for management of risk through precise calculation and 
measurement, coupled with a confidence in the robustness and accuracy of 
the mathematical models underlying the measurements.
126
 
1. Risk Management as Responsibility Allocation and Internal 
Control 
The first stage of risk management regulation represents less of a 
novel regulatory approach than an effort to translate traditional board duties 
to oversee corporate affairs into a new operating environment in which risk 
acquired ever-greater salience.  It is also characterized by an importation of 
internal control mandates into more contexts.  This early story starts in the 
1980s, perhaps unexpectedly with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(FHLBB), the former regulator of federally chartered savings associations 
(known alternatively as “thrifts”) that by the end of the decade would be 
discredited and disbanded due to its perceived ineffectiveness in the lead-
up to the savings-and-loan debacle.
127
  During the early part of the decade, 
by force of necessity, the FHLBB was an innovator.  Dramatic spikes in 
short-term interest rates created a crisis for the savings-and-loan industry, 
which held assets in the form of long-term mortgage loans.  The FRB’s 
Regulation Q, which at that time capped interest rates on deposits, provided 
some initial support, but thrift depositors began to withdraw en masse in 
favor of investment vehicles unencumbered by Regulation Q, such as 
money market mutual funds (MMMFs), which were thus able to offer 
competitive rates.
128
  Former FHLBB member Lawrence White’s describes 
the thrifts’ dilemma as follows: 
With the rising MMMFs rapidly sucking deposits out of thrifts, 
Regulation Q was now at best an irrelevance and at worst a cause 
of disintermediation.  Thrifts could try to prevent deposit 
withdrawals by paying higher interest rates.  Indeed, this was 
tried in June 1978, when the [FRB] loosened Regulation Q 
slightly to allow banks and thrifts to pay market rates on [certain] 
 
 126.  Anette Mikes, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures, 20 MGMT. ACCT. RES.  
18, 35 (2009) [hereinafter Calculative Cultures]. 
 127.  It is testament to the enduring destabilizing force of housing finance in U.S. 
financial markets that the FHLBB’s successor, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), was 
itself replaced in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
on account of its failure to provide adequate supervision of several large thrifts and thrift 
holding companies.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 313-314, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523-24 (2010). 
 128.  LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND 
THRIFT REGULATION 67-71 (1991). 
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CDs . . . . Thrifts, however, would then suffer operating losses, 
since the interest income from their mortgage portfolios would be 
insufficient to cover their interest costs.  Or they could refuse to 
pay the higher interest rates, watch their deposits depart, and be 
forced to liquidate their low-interest mortgages at a loss in this 
high-interest environment.  Either route meant losses.  There was 
no way to avoid red ink.
129
 
In 1984, the FHLBB made an early attempt to influence risk 
management policy at depository institutions
130
 in response to the short-
term interest rate increases.
131
  The FHLBB noted that “[f]requent periods 
of interest-rate volatility make planning for the continued management of 
interest-rate risk a necessity.”
132
  The FHLBB promulgated a rule requiring 
each thrift board of directors to devise and adopt a series of policies to 
manage interest rate risk and senior management to implement those 
policies and report on them periodically to the board.
133
  The FHLBB 
clarified that it did not intend “to intrude upon the business judgment of 
boards of directors of thrift institutions.”
134
  Instead, its purpose was “to 
support responsible management in a task which it has already undertaken 
and to enable the [FHLBB] examiners to do their jobs more efficiently.”
135
  
In the accompanying statement of policy, the FHLBB stated that “[t]he 
interest-rate-risk management procedures . . . are intended to ensure that 
the boards of directors and management of insured institutions address the 
management of interest rate risk.”
136
  Because one of the responses to 
increased volatility on the funding side (i.e., deposits) is to underwrite 
newer products on the asset side (e.g., the newly-approved adjustable-rate 
mortgages), the FHLBB was careful to instruct thrift boards not to lose 
 
 129.  Id. at 69-70. 
 130.  See Interest Rate-Risk Management: Proposed Policy Statement and Rule, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 19,307 (May 7, 1984) [hereinafter IRRM Proposal] (proposing several rules that would 
require the board of directors of each institution insured by the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation to develop and implement policies and procedures for management 
of interest rate risk).   
 131.  Although the discussion in Part II.A emphasizes how derivatives motivated 
regulators to action with respect to risk management, for institutions such as thrifts that were 
restricted from transacting in derivatives markets, the increases in interest rate volatility and 
inflation constituted serious threats to safety and soundness in their own right.   
 132.  Interest-Rate-Risk Management; Policy Statement and Final Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 
27,295, 27,295 (July 3, 1984) [hereinafter IRRM Final Rule]. 
 133.  Id. at 27,295-96.  Responsibility for enforcement of the rule was eventually 
transferred to the OTS.  Transfer and Recodification of Regulations Pursuant to Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,411 (Nov. 30, 
1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.176); supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 134.  IRRM Proposal, supra note 130, at 19,308. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  IRRM Final Rule, supra note 132, at 27,298. 
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sight of the multi-dimensionality of risk profiles.
137
 
The FHLBB proved itself a regulatory innovator in the risk 
management arena again when it developed similar responsibility-
allocating guidelines in the 1988 Thrift Bulletin No. 12 with respect to 
what it referred to as “high-risk mortgage derivative products.”
138
  One of 
the major policy responses to the problems posed by increased interest rates 
was to liberalize asset restrictions then in force.  By expanding the range of 
assets thrifts were empowered to hold—for example, credit card and other 
consumer loans, commercial real estate loans, commercial loans, adjustable 
rate mortgages, and indirect equity positions—the FHLBB hoped that 
thrifts might achieve the required rates of return with higher-yielding assets 
that they would need to pay to attract and keep deposited funds.
139
  But the 
FHLBB became concerned that thrifts were assuming risks that 
compromised their safety and soundness as a result of their new investment 
powers, including by speculating in derivatives.
140
  The Federal Financial 
 
 137.  Id. (adding the now superseded 12 C.F.R. 571.3(b)).  Ten years later, the Farm 
Credit Administration (FCA) promulgated a similar rule governing board of director 
oversight of interest rate risk management for banks subject to the farm credit system.  
Funding and Fiscal Affairs, Loan Policies and Operations, and Funding Operations; 
Management of Investments, Liquidity, Interest Rate Risk, and Eligible Investments, 58 
Fed. Reg. 63,034, 63,056-57 (Nov. 30, 1993).  In 1998, the FCA refined the interest rate risk 
management requirements by amending the initial rule to require that the farm credit system 
banks “establish a risk management process that effectively identifies, measures, monitors, 
and controls interest rate risk.”  Organization; Funding and Fiscal Affairs, Loan Policies and 
Operations, and Funding Operations; Disclosure to Shareholders; Title V Conservators and 
Receivers; Capital Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,219, 39,225 (July 22, 1998) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 615.5180) [hereinafter FCA Interest Rate Risk Management Amendments].  The 
1998 amendments also divided corporate responsibility for interest rate risk management in 
the same manner as the earlier FHLBB rule: the board of directors was charged with 
“developing” the interest rate risk management program and senior management was 
responsible for “ensuring that interest rate risk is properly managed on both a long-range 
and a day-to-day basis.”  Id.  Interestingly, though, the 1998 amendments charged the board, 
and not senior management (as with the FHLBB rule), with the “implementation” of the 
rule. 
 138.  FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, THRIFT BULLETIN NO. 12, MORTGAGE 
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS AND MORTGAGE SWAPS 2 (1988) [hereinafter THRIFT BULLETIN NO. 
12], available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/bulletins/rescinded-thrift-
bulletins/ots-tb-12.pdf. 
 139.  See WHITE, supra note 129, at 72-74 (explaining that thrifts’ specialization was 
seen as a major cause of their problems, which could be solved by expanding the assets and 
liabilities the thrifts could hold). 
 140.  See Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines: Proposed Rule; 
Proposed Statement of Policy, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,244, 23, 245 (proposed June 21, 1988) 
(“With the increased investment powers of savings institutions and the increased 
proliferation of types of securities, some insured institutions have expanded their investment 
activity into a variety of securities as an alternative to traditional lending activities.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
141
 itself had published 
supervisory guidance for all bank and thrift examiners concerning these 
new securities activities in 1988,
142
 but the FHLBB went a step further, 
imposing a further set of procedural requirements on thrift boards and 
managers in addition to their post-1984 interest rate risk management 
responsibilities.
143
 
In Thrift Bulletin 12, the FHLBB introduced the problem posed by 
these instruments in terms of the dual nature of derivatives:  “derivative 
products can be useful investment and hedging vehicles,” but “they may 
also expose an institution to considerable risk of loss if they are not 
managed in a safe and sound manner.”
144
  The bulletin set forth guidance 
concerning board oversight; the need for a “comprehensive business plan” 
detailing risk management objectives (including position limits); the 
performance of “[s]ensitivity [a]nalysis” before investing in certain 
instruments;
145
 the critical role of either management expertise or qualified 
third-party advisors; the establishment of internal controls; and awareness 
of potential credit risks posed by insolvent counterparties.
146
  The mention 
of credit risk management was noteworthy since FHLBB and the FFIEC 
 
 141.  Congress established the FFIEC in 1978 to develop a common set of supervisory 
standards to be used by all federal regulators of depository institutions.  See RICHARD SCOTT 
CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 632 (4th ed. 2008) 
(detailing the FFIEC’s composition and its role in promoting regulatory coordination among 
multiple agencies).  The membership of the FFIEC includes the OCC, the FRB, the FDIC, 
and the National Credit Union Administration.  Id.; see also supra note 127 (explaining that 
the OTS no longer exists). 
 142.  See, e.g., Supervisory Policy Statement Concerning Selection of Securities Dealers, 
Securities Portfolio Policies and Strategies and Unsuitable Investment Practices, and 
Stripped Mortgage-Backed Securities, Certain CMO Tranches, Residuals, and Zero-Coupon 
Bonds: Request for Comment, 56 Fed. Reg. 263 (Jan. 3, 1991) (noting that all member 
agencies of FFIEC except FHLBB had adopted FFIEC’s 1988 supervisory guidance); 
Supervisory Policy Concerning Selection of Securities Dealers and Unsuitable Investment 
Practices, 53 Fed. Reg. 14,852 (Apr. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Unsuitable Investment Practices] 
(adopting FFIEC supervisory policy, which banned or restricted certain classes of securities, 
to apply to institutions subject to FRB supervision).  The FFIEC guidance did not address 
risk management in anywhere near the level of detail that the FHLBB did with its Thrift 
Bulletin 12.  The single instance of risk management regulation in the FFIEC guidance was 
its instruction to bank boards to develop and document “plans prescribing specific 
positioning limits and control arrangements for enforcing these limits” for investments in 
“stripped mortgage backed securities.”  Id. at 14,855.  
 143.  THRIFT BULLETIN NO. 12, supra note 138, at 1. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  The sensitivity analysis is an early example of regulator-administered stress testing.  
The FHLBB “strongly recommended” a series of stress scenarios that thrifts should consider 
before investing.  Id. at 2. 
 146.  Id. at 3-4.  The gradual broadening of risk management regulation into credit and 
other non-interest rate risks anticipates the second stage of risk management regulation 
discussed below in Part II.C.1. 
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had previously focused exclusively on interest rate risk. 
A year later, the FHLBB published a more comprehensive investment 
portfolio policy statement applying to all investment activities of thrifts, 
including investing in derivatives.
147
  Again, the FHLBB emphasized the 
importance of a “written investment policy” setting forth the board’s vision 
of the “appropriate investment course for the institution, given the present 
financial position of the institution and the current and reasonably 
anticipated economic environment.”
148
  Further, thrift management would 
be required to develop “investment strategies that set out, in reasonable 
detail, the manner in which the investment policy [would be] 
implemented”—including, for example, the “acceptable range of interest 
rate risk for each type of security.”
149
  Specifically, in setting the interest 
rate risk management strategies, management should include planned 
organizational responses to different interest rate environments and other 
“external factors that past history and current events support as being 
reasonable.”
150
  “Reasonabl[e] foreseeab[ility]”
151
 was undefined, left for 
deliberation by thrift management.  The FHLBB observed that its guidance 
on securities-related risk management flowed from the interaction of the 
regulatory goal of safety and soundness, a board’s duty of care, and the 
need for an adequate internal control environment.
152
  In this respect, the 
FHLBB presaged the key theme picked up on again in the Caremark case, 
the Cadbury Report, and the COSO internal controls framework.  But in 
certain respects, the policy statement went further in that it allocated 
responsibility for establishing systems that would navigate risks that 
threaten the achievement of the board’s entire investment strategy, though 
without specifying what those risks entail. 
 
 147.  See Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines: Final Rule; Final 
Statement of Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,457, 23,458 n.1 (June 1, 1989). 
 148.  Id. at 23,463. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.  GAAP accounting treatment provided (and still provides) that only held-for-
investment (now known as “held-to-maturity”) securities can be accounted for using 
amortized cost accounting – the method that thrifts favored during the 1980s because the 
amortized cost was usually higher than the market values that would otherwise apply.  See 
id. (explaining that amortized cost accounting can only be used when there is a positive 
intent and ability to hold the security to maturity).  With the investment portfolio policy 
statement, the accounting rules interacted with the corporate governance implications of the 
investment risk management policies.  Specifically, the bounds of reasonable foreseeability, 
as set by management, delimited the range of circumstances in which thrifts could sell held-
for-investment securities.  If management believed a set of circumstances to be outside its 
reasonable forecast and to require divestment of otherwise held-for-investment securities, it 
would be required to document its belief.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 23,465-66 (mandating that management document changes to valuation 
methods resulting from circumstances that arise outside the range of foreseeable events). 
WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:53 PM 
2013] THE LAW AND REGULATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT 1039 
 
Early international attempts to shape derivatives risk management 
were similarly limited to responsibility allocation and internal control.  
International bank regulators, including most prominently the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee),
153
 made initial 
forays into risk management to address a problem that U.S. bank regulators 
had not yet addressed.  Its Management of Banks’ Off-Balance-Sheet 
Exposures paper, published in 1986, provided guidance to banks 
concerning risk management practices for derivatives and other off-balance 
sheet exposures.  Noting that off-balance-sheet exposures—including, most 
prominently, derivatives
154
—“raise particular difficulties in view of the[ir] 
complexity,” the Basel Committee warned that “banks run the risk of losses 
arising from any failure to apply adequate control systems.”
155
  The 
Committee’s solution was to remind banks of the importance of internal 
controls
156
 and instruct bank boards as follows: 
[B]ank boards need formal written policies to govern all trading 
activities.  While the ability to make quick decisions is 
undoubtedly a key factor in the current environment, banks may 
need to re-examine the structure of their risk assessment and 
accounting systems, as well as current management procedures, 
in order to ensure that decisions are taken with an informed 
appreciation of the risks.
157
 
A year later, the Bank of England “stated that banks’ records and 
internal controls should identify risk exposure limits, particularly those 
related to derivatives, monitor compliance with such limits, properly value 
positions, and ensure that management was adequately informed.”
158
  In 
1990, France’s Banking Commission promulgated a rule requiring banks to 
set and monitor compliance with limits on risk exposure in connection with 
 
 153.  The Basel Committee is a standing committee composed of bank regulators from 
major developed nations that, among other things, develops important guidelines and 
supervisory standards for bank regulators to implement in their home jurisdictions.  Central 
bank governors and bank supervisors from the Group of Ten nations founded the Basel 
Committee in 1974 under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements to address 
the immediate problems arising in connection with the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt and 
Franklin National banks.  Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and 
Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital 
Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 800 (2010). 
 154.  The Basel Committee also cited guarantees, lending commitments, and 
underwriting commitments as off-balance sheet exposures requiring special attentiveness to 
risk build-up. 
 155.  MANAGEMENT OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES, supra note 61, at 13. 
 156.  Id. at ¶ 46. 
 157.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
 158.  GAO DERIVATIVES REPORT, supra note 67, at 114. 
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interest rate swaps.
159
  In 1991 and 1992, respectively, Swiss and 
Singaporean bank regulators published guidance for domestic banks 
transacting in derivatives markets that emphasized the importance of 
effective internal control systems.
160
 
2. Risk Management as Threat Description and Control 
During the second stage of risk management regulation, Congress and 
bank supervisors expanded their attention from responsibility allocation 
and internal control to developing more specific requirements that banks 
monitor and exert control over a greater array of specified risks.  Congress 
set the tone for this next stage in a rarely examined provision of the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA).  As noted earlier, the FHLBB, likely on account of the unique 
interest rate risk vulnerabilities of the thrift institutions it supervised,
161
 
acted first to address interest rate risk in 1984.
162
  While the thrift industry 
accounted for an outsized proportion of the interest rate risk problems of 
the 1980s, it quickly became apparent that these problems, borne of new 
financial innovations and increased rate volatility, could affect all financial 
institutions equally.  In response, Congress enacted FIRREA.  From a risk 
management perspective, FIRREA is noteworthy because it marks the first 
time that Congress addressed risk management at financial institutions as a 
legislative subject.  Specifically, Congress instructed federal financial 
institution regulators to conduct a study of “[t]he feasibility of developing 
and administering . . . an examination of the principles and techniques of 
risk management and the application of such principles and techniques to 
the management of insured institutions.”
163
  Congress also directed the 
FFIEC
164
 to “develop and administer training seminars in risk 
management” for bank examiners and bank personnel.
165
  The open-ended 
charge afforded wide discretion to regulators to elaborate risk management 
norms concerning an equally open-ended array of risks. 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  See Joint Agency Policy Statement: Interest Rate Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 33,166, 
33,169 (June 26, 1996) [hereinafter Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk] 
(distinguishing commercial banks from thrifts on the grounds that the former “do not hold 
high concentrations” of “residential mortgage assets, especially adjustable rate mortgages”). 
 162.  See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text (describing the FHLBB’s 
activities in the 1980s to address this risk). 
 163.  Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
101-73, § 1001(b)(9), 103 Stat. 183, 508 (1989). 
 164.  See supra note 142 (explaining the FFIEC’s role as standard setter for bank 
examinations). 
 165.  Id. § 1218, 103 Stat. at 546 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3309). 
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In 1992, the FFIEC followed the FHLBB’s lead when it published a 
new supervisory policy on securities activities, largely replicating the 
FHLBB’s earlier guidance concerning investment policies and high-risk 
mortgage products and applying it to all federally regulated banking 
institutions.
166
  Notably, however, the FFIEC specifically required banks to 
consider, in addition to interest rate risk, other risk factors such as: asset-
liability mismatching, asset concentration risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, 
market volatility risk, and “management’s capabilities”
167
 – an early 
reference to a new category of risk that later would be labeled “operational 
risk.”
168
  If FIRREA signaled to bank regulators congressional expectations 
that they develop more detailed risk management guidance, the 1992 policy 
initiated a period during which the regulators sharpened their focus on the 
specific risks that banks should be managing. 
In 1993, the OCC published Circular 277, entitled Risk Management 
 
 166.  See Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 4,028 
(Feb. 3, 1992) (updating and revising the FFIEC’s policy on selection of securities dealers 
and requiring the establishment of prudent policies for transactions).  Once the FFIEC 
issued its policy statement concerning risk management of securities activities, the FHLBB 
removed its earlier investment portfolio policy statement and Thrift Bulletin 12 concerning, 
respectively, securities activities and mortgage derivatives.  Investment Portfolio Policy and 
Accounting Guidelines: Final Rule; Removal of Statement of Policy and Conforming 
Amendments, 57 Fed Reg. 26,989 (June 17, 1992); OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, THRIFT 
BULLETIN NO. 52, SUPERVISORY STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SECURITIES ACTIVITIES (Jan. 10, 
1992).  For a discussion of these superseded policies, see supra notes 138-152 and 
accompanying text. 
 167.  Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. at 4034; see 
also Investment Portfolio Policy and Accounting Guidelines: Final Rule; Removal of 
Statement of Policy and Conforming Amendments, 57 Fed Reg. at 26,989-90 (setting forth 
Section II of the policy statement regarding “policies and strategies”).  Another notable 
aspect of the 1992 supervisory policy took the form of a technology-based, structural 
regulatory rule applying certain conservative accounting rules to mortgage-related 
derivatives meeting any of three supervisory tests, known as “high-risk tests,” that gauged 
the perceived riskiness of the derivative.  Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities 
Activities: Statement of Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 4,031 (setting forth Section III of the policy 
statement regarding “Mortgage Derivative Products, Other Asset Backed Products, and 
Zero-Coupon Bonds”).  The contrast between the high-risk test rule and the risk 
management guidelines recalls the Coglianese-Lazer distinction between technology-based 
regulation and management-based regulation: the former is a structural, top-down, 
technology-based rule that was already very nearly an anachronism at that stage, whereas 
the latter are classic examples of ambitious management-based regulation.  See supra notes 
30-37 and accompanying text (explaining differences between technology-based regulation 
and management-based regulation).  Regulators would struggle with this sort of 
methodological choice throughout this period, nearly always eschewing technology-based 
regulation on the grounds that, as noted by Tarullo, the “risks associated with the 
complexity and pace of large bank activities cannot be effectively contained even with 
sophisticated rules.”  TARULLO, supra note 69, at 274. 
 168.  BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 55, at 144. 
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of Financial Derivatives.
169
  When it was issued, the Circular was the most 
comprehensive regulatory taxonomy of risks and description of regulatory 
expectations with respect to risk management practices.  The largest banks 
have always been the most significant derivatives dealers because they are 
perceived as the most stable counterparties due to their massive balance 
sheets and access to government safety nets.  It is not surprising, then, that 
the OCC—which is charged with the supervision of federally chartered 
banks such as today’s J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and 
Citigroup—was the first regulator to address risk management norms in a 
systematic manner.  The Circular addressed market, credit, liquidity, legal, 
and operational risks.  It applied to all national banks, though the OCC 
recognized that banks that were dealers or active position takers would 
likely require more extensive risk management programs than banks that 
were more limited end-users of derivatives (e.g., for hedging purposes).
170
 
Circular 277 recited as its basic premise the dual nature of 
derivatives
171
 and noted the OCC’s position that “the best defense against 
sizeable individual losses or significant systemic disruptions is the 
implementation and use by individual banks of sound and efficient risk 
management systems.”
172
  If properly designed, such systems “should 
prevent significant losses due to counterparty failure or adverse changes in 
market conditions.”
173
  National banks were to implement “comprehensive 
risk management systems” to “ensure that market factors affecting risk 
exposures are adequately measured, monitored, and controlled.”
174
  The 
OCC nodded its head in approval at the “sophisticated approaches” to 
managing derivatives-related risks that several banks had developed, and it 
indicated that it expected banks themselves to develop the content of the 
risk management norms.
175
 
For banks that offered dealer services or conducted trading operations, 
the systems would need to quantify market risk exposures as well as 
“facilitate stress testing and enable management to assess the potential 
impact of various changes in market factors on earnings and capital.”
176
  In 
performing the stress tests, banks were directed to evaluate risk exposures 
under various scenarios that represent a broad range of potential market 
 
 169.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR NO. 277, RISK 
MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993) [hereinafter OCC CIRCULAR 277]. 
 170.  Id. at 15, 21. 
 171.  See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing how derivatives are used 
to both enhance and minimize market exposure).  
 172.  OCC CIRCULAR 277, supra note 170, at 4. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 8. 
 175.  Id. at 1. 
 176.  Id. at 9. 
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movements and corresponding price declines. 
As for credit risk, banks were required to ensure that derivatives 
transactions were authorized and consistent with risk management policies.  
Again, the OCC emphasized the need to quantify exposures, this time by 
producing a “number representing a reasonable approximation of loan 
equivalency, that is, the amount of credit exposure inherent in a comparable 
extension of credit.”
177
  The exposure quantity would take into account 
current exposure and a more opaque “credit risk add-on” charge that 
represented “the likelihood that market rates or prices will change over the 
life of a contract.”
178
 
These risk management systems would contain exposure limits with 
respect to credit risk and “inter-connected risk positions” and regular 
reporting to senior management and the board of directors.
179
  In a preview 
of the next thematic stage of risk management regulation, the OCC noted 
that bank management should make efforts to “develop the ability . . . to 
determine the aggregate risk profile of the institution.”
180
  In addition to the 
risk management systems, the Circular dictated that a risk management 
infrastructure should include: (i) comprehensive written policies, reviewed 
by senior management and endorsed by the board of directors, governing 
the use of derivatives; (ii) a dedicated risk management unit or individual 
responsible for “measuring and reporting” exposures;
181
 and (iii) audit 
coverage of derivatives-related risks by auditors independent of the units 
transacting in derivatives.
182
 
Two months after the OCC published Circular 277, the FRB issued 
Supervisory Letter 93-69, which provided guidance with respect to the risk 
management of securities and derivatives trading activities for FRB-
regulated banks.
183
  Supervisory Letter 93-69 largely tracked the content of 
 
 177.  Id. at 13. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 8. 
 180.  Id. at 10. 
 181.  Id. at 7. 
 182.  Id. at 7-13.  The Circular did not require an outside audit of derivatives activities. 
 183.  The terms of Supervisory Letter SR 93-69 specifically targeted the operating 
companies and branches subject to FRB supervision: state banks that are members of the 
Federal Reserve System, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and FRB-chartered 
affiliates of bank holding companies conducting international banking business (named 
“Edge [Act] corporations” after the 1919 Edge Act that added section 25A to the Federal 
Reserve Act).  BD. GOV. FED. RES. SYS., SR 93-69 (FIS), EXAMINING RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR TRADING ACTIVITIES OF BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1993).  
The FRB noted, however, that the principles in the Letter applied equally to FRB-regulated 
holding company systems and directed holding company examiners to “assess 
management’s application of [the] guidance to the holding company . . . where appropriate.”  
Id. 
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Circular 277.  Specifically, the Letter emphasized three elements required 
of risk management systems: (i) board and management oversight; (ii) a 
risk management process comprised of a “comprehensive risk 
measurement approach,”
184
 detailed limits and parameters governing risk 
taking, and a strong communication system for monitoring and reporting 
risk exposures within the bank; and (iii) internal controls and audit 
procedures.
185
  It too made overtures to a more comprehensive form of risk 
management that would aggregate risk exposures throughout the institution 
using a common set of parameters, though it ultimately urged the 
integration of the mandatory risk management processes into the 
institution’s overall risk management system “to the fullest extent 
possible.”
186
 
From a corporate governance perspective, Circular 277 and 
Supervisory Letter 93-69 represented a new, albeit imprecise, venture into 
competences previously considered the exclusive purview of management 
and the board of directors:  setting risk limits, communication lines, and 
internal audit procedures.  While the latter two concerns are arguably part 
of any internal controls program, the establishment of risk limits was a new 
and noteworthy regulatory development, though the OCC left the methods 
by which the risk limits were to be formulated undeveloped. 
For its part, the Basel Committee expanded on its 1986 guidance
187
 
when it published a 1994 paper entitled Risk Management Guidelines for 
Derivatives.
188
  The 1994 guidance sounded the same themes as OCC 
Circular 277: board and management oversight, internal controls and 
audits, and the newer requirement of a “risk management process.”
189
  The 
guidance pertaining to oversight was anodyne, simply applying the near-
universal precept that management assumes responsibility for the policies 
for conducting business while the board approves significant policies 
relating to the management of risks throughout the institution.  The 
guidance for internal controls and audits was similarly uneventful.  
Importantly, however, the Basel Committee agreed with the OCC that 
where a firm engages in large-scale derivatives activities, it should 
establish an independent risk management unit.  But the Basel Committee 
went further than the OCC, stating that the “personnel staffing independent 
risk management functions should have a complete understanding of the 
 
 184.  Id. at 3.  
 185.  Id. at 1-3. 
 186.  Id. at 3. 
 187.  See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Basel 
Committee’s early work.  
 188.  BASEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 5. 
 189.  Id. passim. 
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risks associated with all of the bank’s derivatives activities.”
190
  Before 
engaging in new derivatives activities, management was instructed to 
conduct “an analysis of the risks that may arise from the activities.”
191
  The 
novelty of the guidance is, as with Supervisory Letter 93-69 and Circular 
277, its discussion of the “risk management process” itself. 
As mentioned earlier, Congress enacted FDICIA in 1991, overhauling 
many of the laws concerning bank supervision and resolution.
192
  Section 
305 of FDICIA constituted another intrusion into risk management 
practices by federal authorities.  Specifically, it instructed all federal 
banking regulators to incorporate consideration of interest rate risk into the 
capital adequacy regime.
193
  Federal regulators jointly implemented this 
directive after an extensive rulemaking process through two regulatory 
actions.  First, they revised capital standards to “explicitly include a bank’s 
exposure to declines in [its] economic value due to changes in interest rates 
as a factor that [regulators would] consider when evaluating . . . capital 
adequacy.”
194
  Second, they published a Final Joint Agency Policy on 
Interest Rate Risk, which identified the key elements of what regulators 
would consider sound management of interest rate risk.
195
  The revisions to 
the capital standards, published in 1995, amounted to little more than an 
expression of regulators’ intention to take interest rate risk into 
consideration.  In other words, instead of assessing a specific capital charge 
for interest rate risk as Congress intended, they implemented section 305 
by tautology.  The regulators referred to this approach, which relied on a 
combination of “quantitative and qualitative factors,” as a “‘risk 
assessment’ approach.”
196
  At the time, however, regulators saw the risk 
assessment approach as a short-term solution and anticipated replacing the 
provisory risk assessment approach with an explicit minimum capital 
charge.
197
 
While deliberating on the optimal form for the minimum capital 
charge, the FRB, OCC, and FDIC took note that the banks under their 
supervision had “been offering and holding a growing variety of products . 
 
 190.  Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the changes following 
the savings and loan crisis). 
 193.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-242, 
§ 305, 105 Stat. 2236, 2354 (1991).  Section 305 also addressed credit concentration risk 
and the risks of “nontraditional activities.”  Id.  
 194.  Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,490, 39,491 
(Aug. 2, 1995). 
 195.  Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk, supra note 162, at 33,166. 
 196.  Id. at 33,169. 
 197.  See id. at 33,167 (“The intent of the agencies at that time was to implement an 
explicit minimum capital charge for interest rate risk at a future date . . . .”). 
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. . such as certain collateralized mortgage obligations and structured notes” 
and that “a variety of pricing indices and embedded options [were now] 
incorporated into their commercial and retail bank products.”
198
  These 
exposures complicated the ability of bank regulators to construct a set 
capital charge that apportioned an appropriate amount of capital to cover 
the array of new, often firm-specific, exposures.  In the face of their 
uncertainty, the regulators responded with an unconventional solution:  
they would retain the risk assessment approach indefinitely and instead 
seek to influence the risk management process directly by making the 
quantitative and qualitative factors a permanent feature of capital 
regulation.  In most cases, the regulators would administer the quantitative 
factors by looking to the estimates generated by the banks’ internal risk 
management systems.
199
  The regulators would gauge the qualitative factors 
by evaluating “whether a bank follows sound risk management practices 
for interest rate risk when assessing its aggregate interest rate risk exposure 
and its need for capital.”
200
  The regulators provided guidance concerning 
their recommendations for sound risk management.  Specifically, those 
recommendations included both substantive requirements and procedural 
corporate governance elements.  The substantive requirements mandated 
that banks put in place the following: 
[p]olicies and procedures designed to control the nature and 
amount of interest rate risk the bank takes, including those that 
specify risk limits and define lines of responsibilit[y] and 
authority for [risk management]; 
[a] system for identifying and measuring interest rate risk; 
[a] system for monitoring and reporting risk exposures; and 
[a] system of internal controls, review, and audit to ensure the 
integrity of the . . . risk management [function].
201
 
Boards were instructed to: (i) “establish and guide” the bank’s risk 
tolerance (including by setting risk limits);
202
 (ii) identify persons 
responsible for managing risk;
203
 (iii) ensure adequate resources are 
devoted to risk management; and (iv) monitor the bank’s overall risk 
 
 198.  Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk, supra note 161, at 33,168-69. 
 199.  Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk, 60 Fed. Reg. at 39,491. 
 200.  Final Joint Agency Policy on Interest Rate Risk, supra note 162, at 33,169. 
 201.  Id. at 33,170. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id.  The responsibilities to be allocated pertained to the identification of potential 
interest rate risk arising from existing or new products or activities, the establishment and 
maintenance of an interest rate risk measurement system, the formulation and execution of 
strategies to manage interest rate exposures, and the authorization of exceptions to risk 
management policies.  Id. at 33,171. 
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profile.
204
  Senior management, on the other hand, was to: (i) translate the 
board’s risk tolerance into implementable policies; (ii) ensure adherence to 
lines of responsibility established by the board; (iii) oversee the 
implementation and maintenance of systems that “identify, measure, 
monitor, and control” interest rate risk; and (iv) establish “internal controls 
. . . to ensure the integrity of the . . . risk management process.”
205
  This 
expansive treatment of interest rate risk management recalled several of the 
key principles animating the OCC and FRB treatment of risk management 
for derivatives in OCC Circular 277 and FRB Supervisory Letter 93-69. 
While the FFIEC and its member agencies articulated their 
expectations for what risk management systems should look like, they were 
contemporaneously working to incorporate those new norms into their 
supervisory rating system.  The FFIEC amended its Uniform Financial 
Institutions Ratings System (UFIRS) system for rating depository 
institutions for supervisory examination purposes to include express 
consideration of risk management.
206
  The UFIRS rating system, known 
more commonly as CAMELS,
207
 was adopted in 1979 to provide a uniform 
basis for evaluating the soundness of depository institutions and a means of 
identifying institutions requiring special supervisory attention or concern.
208
  
Under the UFIRS, each depository institution is assigned a composite 
rating based on an evaluation and rating of essential components of an 
institution’s financial condition and operations:  the adequacy of capital, 
the quality of assets, the capability of the board of directors and 
management, the quality and level of earnings, the adequacy of liquidity, 
and the sensitivity to market risk.  The 1996 amendments, among other 
things, incorporated sensitivity to market risk as a component for the first 
time and instructed examiners to accord “increasing emphasis on the 
quality of risk management processes in each of the component ratings, 
particularly in the Management component[.]”
209
  In making the changes, 
the FFIEC incanted the traditional story dogma that risk management was 
an antidote to the new risk profiles of banks: 
Changes in the financial services industry, however, have 
 
 204.  See id. at 33,170 (calling specifically for determining “lines of authority and 
responsibility”). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021 (Dec. 19, 
1996). 
 207.  CAMELS is an acronym standing for Capital adequacy, quality of Assets, 
capability of Management, Earnings quality, Liquidity adequacy, and Sensitivity to market 
risk.  The 1996 amendments incorporated consideration of market risk sensitivity for the 
first time; prior to that point, UFIRS was referred to as CAMEL with the “S” omitted.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 67,022. 
 209.  Id. at 67,022 (emphasis added).   
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broadened the range of financial products offered by institutions 
and accelerated the pace of transactions.  These trends reinforce 
the importance of institutions having sound risk management 
systems.  Accordingly, the revised rating system contains explicit 
language in each of the components emphasizing management’s 
ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control risks.
210
 
Since 1979, the FRB has had a separate supervisory rating system (known 
as BOPEC) for its examination of bank holding company systems.  By the 
time the FFIEC published its UFIRS amendments, the FRB had already 
issued a supervisory letter in 1995 incorporating consideration of risk 
management into the management component of the UFIRS and BOPEC 
ratings for FRB-regulated institutions.
211
  In 2004, the FRB eliminated 
BOPEC altogether and replaced it with a new bank holding company rating 
system, known by the cumbersome acronym RFI/C(D), that requires a 
standalone assessment of risk management.
212
 
3. Risk Management as Comprehensive Enterprise Protection 
The third thematic phase of risk management regulation is 
characterized by increased quantitative enthusiasm and confidence in the 
ability of banks to manage their exposures on a comprehensive, enterprise-
wide basis by understanding interconnections among exposures and 
aggregating them with common risk metrics.  In certain respects, this was a 
return to first principles:  a reminder both that the board of directors and 
executives were responsible for risk policy design and implementation, and 
that mechanical application of technical know-how on a portfolio-by-
portfolio basis and a risk-by-risk basis was not adequate.
213
  No longer 
would it be enough to put in place risk limits and policies; risk needed to be 
managed across and throughout financial conglomerates.  In this respect, 
 
 210.  Id. at 67,023-24. 
 211.  Supervisory Letter 95-51, which has since been superseded by the RFI/C(D) 
ratings system discussed in the subsequent footnote, instructed examiners to assign a formal 
supervisory rating to the adequacy of FRB-regulated institutions’ risk management systems, 
to be “given significant weight” when evaluating the management component of the UFIRS 
and the FRB’s supervisory rating system for bank holding companies (known at the time as 
BOPEC).  See FRB GUIDELINES FOR RATING RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 123124.   
 212.  Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,444 (Dec. 6, 2004).  The 
risk management (R) component from the new RFI/C(D) system is “based on the same 
guidance that has been used to rate risk management since 1995”—i.e., since the issuance of 
Supervisory Letter 95-51.  Id. at 70,445. 
 213.  See DAS, supra note 27, at 4 (explaining difference between “trading risk 
management”—or “micro risk management at the level of individual traders and trading 
desks”—and “firm wide risk management”—which focuses on “matching risk. . . with 
capital to ensure the ability of the [entire] firm to absorb trading risk”). 
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the regulatory guidance must be considered alongside the burgeoning field 
of enterprise risk management (ERM). 
Though bank regulators largely avoided the ERM term, they embraced 
its almost utopian pretension of total risk control.  As a reminder that the 
stages of risk management highlighted in this Part are more thematic than 
strictly chronological, consider the Basel Committee’s 1986 preview of 
ERM (before it was known as such): 
It is not sufficient, however, to concentrate on the specific risks 
of individual instruments.  Central coordination and control of 
the totality of the risk involved in trading in a variety of different 
instruments is also important because of the linkages between 
them.  This is no easy task.  Since it is obviously more difficult 
for banking groups with extensive decentralized branch networks 
and extended corporate structures to coordinate their operations 
than for single compact units, attention also has to be paid to the 
need for high standards of group control and for a worldwide 
consolidated approach to the supervision of risks, both on and off 
the balance sheet.
214
 
At the time the Basel Committee did not develop the notion further.  
By 2004, however, COSO had published Enterprise Risk Management—
Integrated Framework, which built on the earlier internal controls 
framework
215
 and purported to direct information flows regarding risk 
within an organization so as to “strike an optimal balance between growth 
and return goals and related risks” and “effectively deploy[] resources in 
pursuit of the entity’s objectives.”
216
  The COSO framework noted that, 
“[i]n sum,” ERM “helps an entity get to where it wants to go and avoid 
pitfalls and surprises along the way.”
217
  The COSO ERM framework 
identifies eight “components” of ERM: (1) the firm’s internal environment 
must set the tone for how risk is viewed and addressed; (2) management 
must identify objectives in order to properly identify risks that compromise 
the firm’s objectives; (3) events affecting the achievement of firm goals 
(both risks and opportunities) must be identified and communicated to 
management for purposes of re-evaluating firm strategy and objectives; (4) 
risk must be assessed according to probability and impact; (5) management 
must select responses to identified risks; (6) controls must be established to 
track firm progress; (7) relevant information must be identified, captured, 
 
 214.  MANAGEMENT OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES, supra note 61, at 14. 
 215.  See supra notes 9899-104105 and accompanying text for a description of the 
COSO internal controls framework. 
 216.  COMM. OF THE SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 1 (2004) [hereinafter COSO ERM FRAMEWORK], 
available at http://www.coso.org/documents/coso_erm_executivesummary.pdf.  
 217.  Id. 
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and communicated in a form and timeframe that enables responsible parties 
to perform; and (8) the entire ERM infrastructure must be monitored and 
modified as necessary.
218
  The framework resonated with the development 
of so-called economic capital modeling, which referred to the quantitative 
techniques by which banks and other financial institutions would allocate 
capital to business lines, product categories, portfolios, and individual 
assets consistent with mathematical estimates of risks across the institution 
as a whole.
219
  The COSO ERM framework, like the COSO internal 
controls framework, is not a source of law itself, but rather its pretensions 
to comprehensive risk control help frame the third thematic phase of risk 
management regulation. 
For instance, the FFIEC articulated a broad ERM-type vision in a 
1998 policy statement that it heralded as a new comprehensive “risk-based 
supervision approach” to bank examination.
220
  The policy statement, titled 
Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities and End-User 
Derivatives Activities, supplemented the 1996 Final Joint Agency Policy on 
Interest Rate Risk
221
 and replaced the 1992 Supervisory Policy Statement on 
Securities Activities.
222
  The earlier 1992 policy statement had, as noted 
above, subjected several types of derivatives to so-called “high risk tests” 
to determine their accounting treatment.
223
  In the years leading up to the 
1998 re-work of the policy, FFIEC members began to question the 
effectiveness of the “pass/fail criteria of the high risk tests[.]”
224
  In 
particular, they feared that the specification of the tests had dulled the 
 
 218.  Id. at 3-4. 
 219.  See Esa Jokivuolle, Aligning Regulatory Capital with Economic Capital, in RISK 
MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 24, at 455 (noting the importance of 
consistently applying minimum capital requirements to all banks regardless of the 
institutions’ own perspectives on capital requirements). 
 220.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NO. OCC 1998-20, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT SECURITIES (1998), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/bulletins/1998/bulletin-1998-20.html. 
 221.  See supra notes 196-206 and accompanying text for details of the publication.  The 
scope of the new policy statement was broad, though it excluded derivatives transactions 
that were recorded as trading transactions.  See Supervisory Policy Statement on Investment 
Securities and End-User Derivatives Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,191, 20,194 (Apr. 23, 1998) 
(defining the scope of the guidance as including money market instruments, different types 
of notes, asset-backed securities, and mortgage derivative products).    See also Risk-Based 
Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (Sept. 6, 1996) (noting that 
transactions recorded on the trading account were already subject to separate supervisory 
treatment under the 1996 risk-based capital regime applicable to market risk exposures). 
 222.  See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text for details regarding the 
Supervisory Policy Statement. 
 223.  Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities, supra note 166. 
 224.  Supervisory Policy Statement on Investment Securities and End-User Derivatives 
Activities, supra note 222, at 20,192. 
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incentives of banks to perform meaningful risk assessment and analysis.  
Accordingly, FFIEC eliminated the high-risk tests and emphasized, using a 
formulation that was by this point familiar, that “an effective risk 
management program, through which an institution identifies, measures, 
monitors, and controls the risks of investment activities, provides a better 
framework.”
225
  The regulators again stressed their belief that risk 
management was an antidote to the increasing complexity of on- and off-
balance sheet assets
226
 and that a risk management program must entail 
procedural, technical, and internal control elements.
227
  Though much of the 
1998 policy statement could be characterized as humdrum from the 
perspective of the banks, the FFIEC nevertheless expressed the most 
comprehensive statement of risk management norms yet in U.S. banking 
regulation:  “Effective risk management addresses risks across all types of 
instruments on an investment portfolio basis and ideally, across the entire 
institution.”
228
  This dictate widened the dimensionality, though not the 
number, of subjects that bank risk management departments were to 
monitor and control.
229
  “To the extent practicable,” measurements of 
exposures “should be aggregated and integrated with similar exposures 
arising from other business activities to obtain the institution’s overall risk 
profile.”
230
 
The 1998 policy statement did not venture into virgin territory.  We 
have already seen how OCC Circular 277 and FRB Supervisory Letter 93-
69 required bank risk managers to consider the interconnections between 
risk positions and develop methods for determining institution-wide, 
aggregate risk profiles.
231
  In 1996, the OCC issued guidance in an advisory 
letter regarding the newly developed credit derivatives, such as credit 
default swaps and total return swaps.
232
  The 1996 credit derivatives 
 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See id. (citing the need for a comprehensive response to the increased investment 
risk). 
 227.  Id. at 20,194. 
 228.  Id. at 20,192 (emphasis added). 
 229.  Recall that the 1992 Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities had 
already required banks to address asset-liability mismatching, asset concentration risk, 
liquidity risk, credit risk, market volatility risk, and operational risk. See supra note 168 and 
accompanying text. 
 230.  Supervisory Policy Statement on Investment Securities and End-User Derivatives 
Activities, supra note 222 at 20,194.  
 231.  See supra notes 180-181 and 184-187 and accompanying text (discussing OCC 
Circular 277). 
 232.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC 1996-43, DESCRIPTION OF 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL BANKS WITH RESPECT TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES (1996), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin-1996-43.html. 
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guidance cited the treatment of “interconnection risk” in Circular 277.
233
  
However, the 1996 guidance went a step further.  The Circular only 
required banks to “develop” aggregate, institution-wide estimates of risk, 
but the 1996 guidance imposed consideration of correlations and 
interconnections among portfolio positions as a pre-condition to transacting 
in credit derivatives.
234
  Another advisory letter, issued in 1994 to cover 
structured notes, expressed similarly high expectations of risk management: 
“The OCC considers it an unsafe and unsound practice for a bank to 
purchase material amounts of structured notes, or any other bank asset, 
without a full appreciation of the risks involved.”
235
 
D. Risk Management and Capital Adequacy 
This section chronicles how the nuts and bolts of the capital adequacy 
regime, the linchpin of modern bank regulation, gradually transformed 
from a relatively simple and mechanical set of supervisory formulas to the 
regulation of risk management.  The three-stage regulatory process 
discussed above in sub-Part II.C addresses risk management systems as 
part of the examination process.  By the mid-1990s, however, the Basel 
Committee had begun to address risk management as part of the capital 
adequacy regime too.  Before addressing the Basel Committee’s coupling 
of risk management and capital regulation, however, an early industry-
based endeavor merits special attention.  In 1993, the Group of Thirty, a 
committee composed of senior bankers and their lawyers, published 
perhaps the ultimate expression of the traditional risk management story 
during this period:  a consultative report entitled Derivatives: Practice and 
Principles.  The report presents the industrial vision of risk management as 
an aspirational system of control characterized by quantitative enthusiasm 
and a faith in the ability of risk managers to reduce risk exposures to 
common variables susceptible to enterprise-wide aggregation. 
The report aimed to “define a set of sound risk management practices 
for dealers and end-users” of derivatives.
236
  Despite the Group’s assertion 
that its efforts were to be considered separately from ongoing regulatory 
 
 233.  Id. at 2. 
 234.  Id. at 3 (“Prior to substantial participation in the market for credit derivatives, 
protection selling banks should thoroughly evaluate their credit portfolios, identifying credit 
concentrations and risk inter-connections, in order to assess how these products can best 
help to achieve strategic portfolio objectives.”). 
 235.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 94-2, 
PURCHASES OF STRUCTURED NOTES 4 (July 21, 1994), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/pre-1995/advisory-letter-
1994-2.pdf (emphasis added). 
 236.  PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46 (preface). 
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initiatives concerning risk management, it picked up on the same themes.  
Included in the document were twenty-four recommendations, ranging 
from broad but banal incantations of senior management’s oversight 
responsibilities to narrow discussions of specific mark-to-market valuation 
methods, standardized contractual provisions, and accounting rules.
237
  The 
Group of Thirty advocated for the measurement of market risk through 
value-at-risk approaches using probability analysis based upon a common 
confidence interval.  J.P. Morgan staff had pioneered value-at-risk 
techniques shortly before the report’s publication in the management of its 
own risk.
238
  The techniques estimated the maximum expected loss from an 
adverse market movement within a specified probability level (known as 
the “confidence level”) over a particular time (known as the “time 
horizon”).
239
  The report presaged the enterprise-wide focus that would 
come to dominate risk management discourse in the later part of the 
decade:  “Reducing market risks across derivatives to a single common 
denominator makes aggregation, comparison, and risk control easier.”
240
  
Moreover, the report urged banks to quantify estimates of current and 
potential future losses due to credit risk despite the acknowledged 
difficulties with assessing the effects of potential defaults.
241
  The report 
also recommended that banks establish dedicated business units, 
independent of revenue generating units, to perform the recommended 
measurement tasks, including most prominently the value-at-risk 
calculations.
242
  The Group of Thirty’s embrace of value-at-risk techniques 
presaged key regulatory actions in subsequent years, starting with the Basel 
 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
(2009). 
 239.  CROUHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 187-88; see also PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 46, at 9-10.  A risk management text frames value-at-risk techniques in terms of 
the questions they answer as follows: 
[Value-at-risk] is not the answer to the simple question:  How much can I lose 
on my portfolio over a given time period?  The answer to this question is 
“everything,” or almost the entire value of the portfolio! . . . Instead, [value-at-
risk] offers a probability statement about the potential change in the value of a 
portfolio resulting from a change in market factors, over a specified period of 
time.  [Value-at-risk] is the answer to the following question . . . :  What is the 
maximum loss over a given time period such that there is a low probability, say 
a 1 percent probability, that the actual loss over the given period will be 
larger? 
CROUHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 187. 
 240.  PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 46, at 11. 
 241.  Id. at 13-14. 
 242.  Id. at 12, 15. 
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Committee’s incorporation of internal models into capital regulation. 
In 1988, the Basel Committee had published its International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, known as the 
“Basel Accord” or, more familiarly, as “Basel I.”
243
  The Basel I regime, 
which applied to internationally active banks, represented the first 
multilateral coordinated system concerning the imposition of credit risk 
capital requirements.  Basel I aimed to ensure banks possessed an adequate 
capital cushion to cover unanticipated losses due to credit risk—that is, the 
risk that borrowers or other counterparties default on their obligations.  
Four years later, the Basel Committee commenced work on a series of 
amendments to the Basel I regime that would address the burgeoning levels 
of market risk to which banks had become exposed due in part to their 
derivatives activities.
244
 
A brief note on capital requirements is in order here.  Regulators 
impose capital requirements to promote the solvency of banks.  Because a 
rash of bank insolvencies can threaten ripple effects to the broader 
economy—a classic negative externality or “social bad”—public policy 
mandates a regulatory response, which has traditionally taken the form of 
government safety nets.  However, the safety nets such as the explicit and 
implicit state guarantees in the form of deposit insurance and in extremis 
support from central banks, attenuate the force of ordinary market 
mechanisms to discipline bank management and heighten the need for a 
further public law intervention to minimize resort to government 
guarantees.  This is where capital requirements come in:  as a fix for a sort 
of corporate governance gap that otherwise biases bank managers towards 
excessive risk-taking.  They might be conceived of as the contractual 
protections, analogous to covenants in private creditor loan agreements and 
indentures, that the government, as the ultimate risk-bearer, demands.  In 
other words, if depositors and other creditors did not receive some sort of 
government guarantee, they would likely check bank risk-taking.  As a 
mechanical matter, capital requirements are, roughly speaking, minimum 
net worth requirements that are calibrated to the perceived riskiness of a 
bank’s asset profile, such that a bank holding a large proportion of risky 
assets, such as developing market corporate loans, will be required to 
maintain a greater net worth than a bank whose assets consist exclusively 
of government bonds.  Capital requirements, then—because they consist of 
governmental mandates imposed as a response to the threat of negative 
 
 243.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988) (updated April 1998), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf. 
 244.  See Weber, supra note 153, at 822-29 (describing the subsequent efforts of the 
Basel Committee). 
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externalities resulting from market failures—are distinguishable from 
purely privatized risk management.
245
  The market risk amendments, 
however, erased this distinction and linked public capital regulation to 
private risk management.  Specifically, the market risk amendments, 
finalized in 1996, pegged banks’ market risk capital requirements to the 
results of the value-at-risk estimations performed by the banks’ own 
internal risk management departments.
246
 
The market risk amendments themselves are intricate, but two aspects 
bear mention here.  First, the gist of the new market risk capital 
requirement would require banks to maintain capital with respect to each 
market risk exposure in an amount sufficient to withstand the maximum 
loss over a ten-day period at a ninety-nine percent confidence level—the 
loss that the bank’s risk managers, using their proprietary and historical 
valuation models, are, statistically speaking, ninety-nine percent sure the 
bank will not incur.
247
  Second, the amendments effectuated a dramatic shift 
in discretion away from accountable public administrators and towards 
private firms unaccountable to the constituencies for whom the public law 
intervention was necessary. 
Here we see the principles set forth in the Group of Thirty report 
incorporated into law.  Prior to the market risk amendments, banks had 
sought for years to persuade regulators to tie capital requirements to risk 
management value-at-risk models.
248
  And the Basel Committee did not 
stop with market risk.  In 2004, the Basel Committee published a 
comprehensive capital regulation framework, popularly known as “Basel 
 
 245.  Looked at from the perspective of bank regulators, capital requirements 
complement risk management systems.  See, e.g., FCA Interest Rate Risk Management 
Amendment, supra note 138, at 39,219 (suggesting that “new interest rate risk 
[management] regulations and policy statement will improve FCA oversight of the System 
by supplementing existing capital regulations, which specifically address only credit risk.”); 
see also Regulatory Capital: Interest Rate Risk Component: Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,529, 53,531 (proposed Dec. 31, 1990) (imposing an interest 
rate risk capital requirement while at the same time applauding the adoption of “meaningful 
interest rate risk management programs and hedging strategies” following “the stress of the 
1979-82 period”). 
 246.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO 
INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS (1996), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf?noframes=1.  Banks technically had the option to opt 
for a “standardized” approach that set forth fixed, computational formulas.  See Weber, 
supra note 153, at 822-23 (distinguishing the Basel Committee’s amendment from previous 
regulatory efforts because it allowed regulated banks to choose the standard or internal 
models methods for computing capital risk charges). 
 247.  Id. at 823. 
 248.  See, e.g., Regulatory Capital: Interest Rate Component, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,529 
(proposed Dec. 31, 1990) (encouraging the practice of tying capital requirements to interest 
rates). 
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II,” that, among other things, allowed banks to set their credit risk capital 
requirements by reference to estimates of (i) probability of default and (ii) 
losses in the event of default generated internally by banks’ risk 
management units.
249
  Even more provocatively, the Basel II framework 
would permit banks to determine their capital requirements covering 
operational risk by reference to internally-generated estimates of loss.
250
  
With Basel II, capital adequacy became definitively joined at the hip to risk 
management.  In the words of the vice-chairman of the FRB at the time 
Roger Ferguson, Basel II was “as much a proposal for strengthening risk 
management as it is a proposal for improving capital standards.”
251
  To 
Ferguson, “these considerations are, as they should be, inseparable.”
252
 
By embracing value-at-risk and related quantitative risk estimation 
techniques as tools of capital regulation, the Basel Committee made two 
related, but distinct, assumptions that introduce the central theme of the 
alternative story.  The first assumption was that the internal estimates by 
bank risk management units were reliable.  We have already seen how the 
regulation of risk management in connection with the examination process 
increasingly came to embrace this view.
253
  The problems with this 
assumption have been taken up exhaustively in the literature, but certain 
aspects bear mention here as reflective of normative assumptions about 
what risk assessment entails.
254
  As a general background observation, the 
widespread unreliability of financial models by which bank capital levels 
were set—for both internal risk management purposes and, for those 
jurisdictions that had implemented the Basel II framework, for regulatory 
capital purposes—was a central factor in the meltdown of the financial 
system in 2008.
255
  Simply put, the models failed to signal credit, market, 
 
 249.  See Weber, supra note 154, at 827-28 (describing key input parameters under the 
internal ratings basis models). 
 250.  See id. at 828-29 (noting that Basel II required banks to include a charge against 
operation risk based on their own risk calculations).  Operational risk was defined as “the 
risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or 
from external events.’” BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 55. 
 251.  Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice-Chairman, Bd. Govs. of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks 
at the ICBI Risk Management 2003 Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, (Dec. 2, 2003), 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031202/default.htm; see also 
HULL, supra note 59, at 188 (interpreting the Basel Committee’s decision to require an 
operational risk capital requirement in part as a push to make banks “pay more attention to 
their internal systems to avoid catastrophes”). 
 252.  Ferguson, supra note 252. 
 253.  See supra  Part II.C. 
 254.  See Allen & Saunders, supra note 56, at 97 (noting that value-at-risk “is a risk 
measurement, not a risk management question”). 
 255.  See James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management 
in Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 735-46 (2009). 
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and liquidity risks in a manner that was effectively communicated to bank 
management.  One pre-crisis survey of empirical work on value-at-risk 
models closes with the following summation:  “So, in short, we ought to be 
able to identify most bad [value-at-risk] models, but the more worrying 
issue is whether we can find any good ones.”
256
  The chief technical 
limitations of value-at-risk models follow from their reliance on historical 
data:
257
  first, such reliance in the context of a value-at-risk model implicitly 
assumes that future losses cannot exceed past losses and second, the results 
of the model are highly sensitive to the look back period on which the 
model is based.
258
  Even when banks model time stochastically—i.e., by 
random computer simulations—the assumptions are deterministic and are 
therefore static.
259
 
A more fundamental limitation follows from the nature of the question 
it answers.  Recall that value-at-risk models determine a loss level that, 
statistically speaking, will not be exceeded at a specified confidence level 
(e.g., ninety-nine percent).  But the premises of this question reflect 
normative assumptions about the risk assessment process.  Even if risk 
managers construct a reliable, robust model, the model will yield the 
minimum worst loss—i.e., the upper bound of the range that the model was 
ninety-nine percent confident total losses would not exceed—rather than 
the expected worst loss.
260
  If the model were ninety-nine percent confident 
that losses would not exceed $100 million, it would be entirely silent about 
the relative likelihood that a rare event would result in a $110 million loss 
or a $100 billion loss.  Moreover, the model results are highly sensitive to 
the selection of the time horizon.  Banks universally use a one-day time 
horizon to measure market risk exposure, which gauges a bank’s 
vulnerability to losses over the next twenty-four-hour-period.  However, 
the Basel Committee has recently observed that “to determine the level of 
capital necessary to remain in business after sustaining a large loss, risk 
must be assessed over a longer holding period.”
261
  In the Basel 
Committee’s defense, the Basel II framework provided for mandatory 
 
 256.  Dowd, supra note 24, at 183, 202. 
 257.  See Hull, supra note 5959 (describing how value-at-risk techniques rely on 
historical data to generate a probability distribution of future exposures). 
 258.  See, e.g., Tanya Beder, VaR: Seductive But Dangerous, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12 
(1995) (examining eight common value-at-risk methodologies and finding that the resulting 
exposure estimates varied by as much as fourteen times on the same portfolio). 
 259.  See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF THE 
TRADING BOOK 59 (2012) [hereinafter TRADING BOOK REVIEW], available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs219.pdf (discussing the limitations of continuous stochastic 
processes in value-at-risk models). 
 260.  See René Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They 
Happen?, 20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 58, 61 (2008) (discussing the mismeasurement of risk).   
 261.  TRADING BOOK REVIEW, supra note 260, at 61. 
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dialogues between banks and regulators concerning modeling assumptions 
and “backtesting” of models (i.e., comparing model predictions with actual 
results) with capital step-ups for banks with underperforming models.
262
  It 
also imposed qualitative and quantitative prerequisites for eligibility to use 
internal models.
263
  To develop further certain of the qualitative 
prerequisites, the OCC published guidance in 2000 concerning model 
validation.
264
  These prerequisites and requirements have served to bolster 
the reliability of the models, but they were silent concerning key issues of 
how banks identify and explore threats as part of their risk assessment 
process. 
The second assumption was that a quantitative approach to risk 
management should comprise the backbone of the new regulatory 
environment.
265
  By thoroughly mathematizing the regulatory capital 
system, regulators implicitly endorsed such an approach.  Though 
regulatory guidance has from time to time addressed the need to 
complement quantitative, mathematical models with judgment and 
experience, the guidance has been vague and largely duplicative of the 
extant risk management regulatory guidance.  Against this background, the 
qualitative dimension of risk management emerges as more of a conceptual 
placeholder than a substantive directive—a reference to an acknowledged, 
but ultimately unresolved, problem.  Both the quantitative emphasis and the 
value-at-risk methodologies themselves reflect a broader problem with the 
risk assessment process that underpins the alternative story discussed 
below:  while regulators have demanded ever greater levels of risk control, 
they have failed to engage sufficiently on the political-rhetorical task of 
threat identification and the descriptive-relational task of exploring the 
causal environments within which the threats operate. 
 
 262.  BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 5555, at 191-97.  The regulator-bank dialogue is 
frustrated by the lack of a credible alternative to approval on the part of the regulator. 
TRADING BOOK REVIEW, supra note 259, at 8-9.   
 263.  BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 5555, at 191-97.  The qualitative pre-requisites 
to the market risk internal models approach echo the then-existing guidance applicable 
generally to risk management systems, including, among other things, independence of the 
risk management unit, active involvement of the board and senior management, existence of 
risk limits tied to risk management models, internal audit functions, and adequate internal 
controls.  Id. at 191-93.  Certain internal model-specific pre-requisites also applied, such as 
the existence of a backtesting program, ongoing validation of models, the integration of the 
model into day-to-day risk management practices (as opposed to regulatory capital 
purposes), and a rigorous program of stress testing.  Id.   
 264.  OCC MODEL VALIDATION GUIDANCE, supra note 126. 
 265.  See generally PABLO TRIANA, THE NUMBER THAT KILLED US: A STORY OF MODERN 
BANKING, FLAWED MATHEMATICS, AND A BIG FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012) (discussing value-at-
risk and its role in financial crises). 
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III. THE ALTERNATIVE STORY:  RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATION 
AS CONCEPTUAL CRUTCH 
“Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future?  No, we cannot; 
but yes, we must act as if we do.”
266
  So opens an essay with a pithy 
distillation of the crux of an alternative story of the history of risk 
management regulation.  Part II presents the traditional story of risk 
management, according to which regulatory interventions are practical, 
functional responses to threats to the achievement of regulators’ statutory 
mandates of financial stability and institution-level safety and soundness.  
As further risks and vulnerabilities were discovered, the regulatory system 
deputized risk management departments to counteract them, providing ever 
more detailed guidance and imposing ever-wider expectations along the 
way.  The alternative story, by contrast, acknowledges the empirical fact of 
risk management as an enhanced organizational and regulatory priority, but 
interrogates its normative assumptions.  It presents the regulatory focus on 
risk management as more of a cultural crutch in response to growing 
anxiety about endemic uncertainty—as a reflection of the aspirations 
underlying the practice rather than the practice as such.
267
  It sees in risk 
management a placeholder delimiting the range of objects that demand 
organizational control rather than the range of objects that are in fact 
susceptible to such control.  It “is a practice which must work because it is 
demanded.”
268
 
Michael Power’s analysis of audit and risk management as cultural 
systems lays the groundwork for this alternative story.  Power describes the 
late 1980s and early 1990s as the era of the “audit society”—a period in 
which audit systems proliferated in a wide variety of contexts.
269
  We have 
seen how risk management grew out of internal control logic, which itself 
can be thought of as a sort of permanent, systemic state of internal audit.  
His observations on the audit society therefore resonate with risk 
management too.  Power adopted the term “audit society” to refer “to the 
tendencies revealed by these commitments rather than an objectively 
identifiable state of affairs.”
270
  The “official meta-accounts” of auditing 
refer to the aspirations of the audit, typically the prevention of fraud, but 
the methodological common sense practices of auditing are heterogeneous 
 
 266.  MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 1 (1982). 
 267.  POWER, supra note 17, at 4. 
 268.  Id. at 11 (writing of audit systems). 
 269.  Id. passim. 
 270.  Id. at 4. 
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and diverse.
271
  To Power, “the idea of audit” is inherently ambiguous 
because “the word is not used simply descriptively to refer to particular 
practices, but normatively in the context of demands and aspirations for 
accountability and control.”
272
  In the process, real operational capabilities 
diverge from the programmatic promises of the audit.
273
 
In the regulatory context, public law authorities impose audit 
requirements as an adaptive response to transformations in conceptions of 
the administrative state, so as to secure continued legitimacy through the 
appearance of control.  The problem of mismatched aspirations and 
operations is most pronounced where audited systems produce outputs that 
are ill-defined such as “true and fair financial statements.”
274
  Such opaque 
outcomes are unlike, say, a wheelbarrow’s fitness for purpose.  In the case 
of the fitness of wheelbarrows, the effectiveness of a quality assurance 
program (QAP) for manufacturing processes is tightly coupled with the 
wheelbarrow product output.  If the QAP certifies the fitness of the 
wheelbarrows and the manufacturer is inundated with warranty claims then 
the QAP will be exposed as inadequate.  Where, on the other hand, outputs 
are not easily observed, the regulatory certification of auditable internal 
control systems can take on a life of its own.  In extreme cases, such 
auditable systems “exist for the [sole] purpose of being externally verified” 
by a regulator that, bearing in mind the irreducible opacity of outputs, is 
unable to verify in a meaningful sense.
275
  Ultimately Power withholds 
express judgment on the effectiveness of the audit society’s control logic,
276
 
but he exposes several flanks in its underlying assumptions that skeptical 
researchers can attack. 
Given the historical and conceptual linkages between internal control 
and risk management, it is not surprising that following his study of the 
audit society, Power next turned his attention to the risk management 
world.  Again, the inquiry is not into the body of technical practices 
performed by risk managers as much as into how the idea of risk 
management is implemented at the organizational level.
277
  Our ideas of 
 
 271.  Id. at 9.  “Instead of a clear conception of output, auditing is constituted by a range 
of procedures backed by experience and judgment.”  Id. at 69; see also id. at 89 (describing 
the “technological base” of auditing as a “diverse and humble assemblage of routines, 
practices, and economic constraints”). 
 272.  Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
 273.  Id. at 9 (referring to the divergence as the “loose coupling in the auditing field 
between accounts of potential and operational capability”); id. at 89 (referring to the 
“imperfect coupling between programmatic demands for control and the realities of 
operationalizing it”). 
 274.  Id. at 85. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. at 89 (reserving final judgment for the empiricists). 
 277.  Id. at 24. 
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what is subject to control or management affect the practices by which we 
control risks and change our expectations concerning the controllability of 
newly emergent, or newly recognized, risks.  In fact, our very idea of what 
constitutes a risk is inevitably affected by the practices and expectations of 
risk management.  Risk managers construct question-solving models that 
beget other challenges demanding the same rationalized control.
278
  New 
ideas about risk management are therefore “performative” inasmuch as 
they “establish new normative climates for decision making and determine 
the way specific risk objects are ‘conceptualized, identified . . . and 
managed’.”
279
 
Power describes a transition from risk analysis to risk governance that 
is characterized by a corporate-managerial ideal.  Whereas the risk 
governance challenge for risk regulators in the decades leading up to the 
1990s was how to develop and select among models to “populate the 
content of risk knowledge,” the mid-1990s reflected a new focus on the 
“models of the management process within which risk analysis 
operates.”
280
  The shift to “managerial forms of risk governance” on the 
part of risk regulators is potentially defensive.  By seeking to govern risk 
management, regulators are engaging, at least in part, in a “strategy to 
govern unruly perceptions and to maintain the production of legitimacy” in 
the face of heightened anxiety about risk.
281
  Risk governance co-exists 
with a “logic of opportunity”
282
 that sees risk not merely as a threat but also 
as an entrepreneurial opportunity.  For example, the introductory paragraph 
of the COSO ERM framework heralds ERM’s ability to equip management 
not only to “effectively deal with uncertainty and associated risk[,]” but 
also to take advantage of “opportunity” and to “enhanc[e] the capacity to 
build value.”
283
  This logic of opportunity has a moral dimension as well, 
and speaks to a new organizational self, capable of self-improvement and 
learning, facing, and managing risk in a rationalized and systematic way.
284
 
 
 278.  See PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND GOVERNMENT 2 (2004) (“Risk 
society theorists further argue that risk-based predictions deliver insecurity rather than 
security, for the more that science discovers, the more it demonstrates that life is saturated 
with risks.”). 
 279.  POWER, supra note 4, at 28 (quoting James F. Short, Jr., Defining, Explaining, and 
Managing Risks, in ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS 39 (Lee Ben Clarke & 
James F. Short eds., 1992)). 
 280.  Id. at 20. 
 281.  Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 282.  Id. at 23. 
 283.  COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 217, at 1. 
 284.  Of course, there is nothing new about financial institutions, or any other business 
enterprise, taking an entrepreneurial view of risk.  To the contrary, that truism is the 
backbone of the capitalist economy.  See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK 
TAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 8 (2008) (“[E]xposure[] to some risk is an 
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Ulrich Beck described late twentieth century society as a “risk 
society,” by which he meant to denote a period when “unknown and 
unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and 
society.”
285
  The moving force behind the shift to the modern risk society 
consists in “the expansion of culturally produced, interdependent 
insecurities and dangers, and the resulting dominance of the public 
perception of risk as staged by the mass media.”
286
  According to this view, 
modernity has made substantial progress in eliminating abject poverty and 
hunger, but has created an array of new pervasive risks that threaten often 
imperceptible and latent hazards.
287
  Beck predicted that societies will 
increasingly struggle over the distribution of these risks the way that former 
societies were characterized by struggles over the distribution of goods and 
resources.
288
  For example, modern risk-producing technologies such as 
nuclear power plants are insusceptible to traditional forms of normative 
political deliberation and control due to their intergenerational impact.
289
  A 
variation on the same theme is the image of a “runaway world.”
290
 
Theorists adopting this broad view have accordingly lamented the 
“pretence of control over the uncontrollable” and view risk management 
primarily as a discursive practice aimed at legitimating a new untamable 
risk environment by portraying it as something that can be managed, 
controlled, and directed.
291
  The proliferation of risk management literature 
and practices starting in the mid-1990s
292
 reflects less of a breakthrough in 
damage control and more of an “increase in social expectations about the 
decidability and management of dangers and opportunities.”
293
  In fact, risk 
 
integral part of success.”).  What is noteworthy, however, is the newfound confidence of 
institutions like banks to understand and quantify risk and apply it to decision processes in a 
systematized, rationalized manner. 
 285.  ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY 22 (Mark Ritter trans. 1992) [hereinafter BECK, RISK 
SOCIETY]. 
 286.  ULRICH BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION 22 (Ciarin Cronin trans. 2006) 
[hereinafter BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION]. 
 287.  See BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION, supra note 287, at 19-23; see also Morgan, 
supra note 15, at 5 (“The statistical evidence shows that Americans live longer, healthier, 
and wealthier lives today than they did at any time in the past.  Perhaps, some economists 
argue, we worry more about risk today precisely because we have more to lose . . . .”). 
 288.  BECK, RISK SOCIETY, supra note 286, at 20. 
 289.  See id. at 162 (discussing the environmental movement’s increased focus on 
“threats that sometimes will not even take their toll in the lifespan of the affected 
individuals, but only in the second generation of their offspring”). 
 290.  See ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING 
OUR LIVES 23 (2000) (discussing the limits of parliamentary democracy exposed by 
globalization). 
 291.  BECK, THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION, supra note 287, at 22. 
 292.  POWER, supra note 4, at 3. 
 293.  Id. at 5. 
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might be distinguished from uncertainty on the grounds that risks are 
objects of organized management and control.
294
  Risk management is then 
properly conceived of as the rhetorical and political practices by which risk 
objects achieve salience within an organization, as well as the 
organizational responses to threats and opportunities the risk object 
presents.  Power describes this process as follows: 
Since the mid-1990s, new categories and ideas have re-shaped 
discourses of risk management, giving them a more central role 
in organizational governance, aligning them with ideals of 
enterprise and subsuming more traditional forms of risk analysis.  
This re-organization and reconceptualization of management 
activity in the name of risk marks a distinctive form of 
administrative innovation, involving the diffusion of new process 
frameworks[;] the organization of new concepts of risk and its 
management; and the creation of new classes of organizational 
actors as authorized representatives of best risk practice.
295
 
Thus, according to the alternative story the risk management revolution is a 
reflection of the anxiety resulting from the loss of control. 
We have seen in Part II how regulatory interventions into internal 
controls and risk management made increasingly ambitious demands of 
bank management to monitor and control risk during the 1980s and 1990s.  
The traditional story sees a management-based regulatory regime in these 
developments.  Implicit in the prominence of internal control mandates was 
an acknowledgement that performance-based regulation of certain difficult 
to monitor outputs of regulatory interest (e.g., control over bribes) was not 
on its own sufficient to achieve certain objectives.  Similarly, command-
and-control technology-based regulatory approaches were viewed 
skeptically on account of their failure to take into account the heterogeneity 
of firm-specific circumstances.  The legal regime, therefore, turned 
organizations (and its own attention) inward rather than outward, focusing 
on the corporate procedures on which outcomes of regulatory interest 
depended.  Whereas the internal control mandates applied in most cases to 
all companies, the regulation of risk management as such took off in the 
bank regulatory context.  This regulatory program is characterized by the 
allocation of responsibility to boards and senior management to manage 
risks; the description of specific risks that must be monitored, controlled, 
and communicated throughout the enterprise; and, in its final expression, 
the imposition of a mandate to account for the interconnectedness of risks 
throughout the enterprise in a comprehensive risk management program.  
 
 294.  Id. at 6. 
 295.  Id. at 28-29. 
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Over time the approach evolved away from simple responsibility allocation 
to comprehensive, enterprise-wide risk management to take into account 
technological advances pioneered by banks’ internal risk management 
departments. 
The recent track record, however, belies key tenets of the traditional 
story and supports instead the alternative story.  Despite the hands-on 
involvement of regulators in the promotion of norms and practices, the 
success of the collection of practices and techniques comprising risk 
management in the banking sector has been equivocal.  As a 2009 OECD 
research paper noted, risk management is “accepted by all” though its 
“track record is poor[.]”
296
  These failures of risk management can be 
analyzed in the context of the broad assessment-and-control framework set 
forth above in Part I to see how the realities fell short of the promise of risk 
management.  To review briefly, risk management describes the idea 
motivating practices that assess and seek to control risk and uncertainty.  
The assessment process has a political-rhetorical dimension that answers 
the question “What objectives matter to the organization, and what 
threatens them?” and a descriptive-relational dimension that answers the 
question “In what ways do future contingent events affect the achievement 
of these objectives?”  The risk control process describes the practices and 
techniques by which organizations utilize the knowledge obtained from the 
assessment process in corporate governance to achieve control.  Though the 
distinction between risk assessment and risk management is admittedly 
blurry, the central themes of the traditional story—responsibility allocation, 
risk description/communication, and comprehensive enterprise-wide risk 
management—focus on the risk control process. 
To an exponent of the alternative story, the poor record of risk 
management regulation is not surprising.  The shaping of risk management 
norms, particularly its control processes, by regulators is more a reflection 
of the pretense of control than an authentic enhancement in the 
functionality of the techniques and methods.  As the legal-regulatory 
infrastructure for the corporate governance of risk control took shape, the 
risk assessment process remained underdeveloped.  Neither practitioners 
nor regulators devoted adequate attention to the processes by which risks 
are identified and their causal environments discovered, or, in other words, 
to the risk assessment process. 
Management researcher Anette Mikes has documented what she terms 
the “quantitative enthusiasm” that pervades risk management 
departments.
297
  In her recent field-based research at financial institutions, 
 
 296.  OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. 
 297.  Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 35. 
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she identified two predominant types of “calculative cultures”:  quantitative 
skepticism and the quantitative enthusiasm.
298
  This meticulous field 
research is helpful to develop the catch-all references to the “tone at the 
top” and “firm culture” that appear in both practitioner and academic 
literature.
299
  As a result of the division, the risk management profession is, 
according to Mikes, “at a crossroads.”
300
  Banks have also largely 
committed themselves to a particular calculative culture in a path 
dependent way, so shifting dramatically to another calculative culture will 
entail significant costs as the risk management function builds the requisite 
resources and capabilities.
301
 
Mikes describes adherents of quantitative enthusiasm in the following 
terms: 
[They believe] that the increasing ability of data and rising 
sophistication of risk modeling render more and more risk types 
manageable by numbers.  “Quantitative enthusiasts” aim to 
replace judgmental risk assessments with risk quantification.  
They believe that risk measures are capable of reflecting the 
underlying economic reality reliably enough to induce requisite 
economic behaviors.  Adherents put a high priority on building, 
maintaining and improving the “robustness” and “accuracy” (i.e. 
the relevance and reliability) of their analytical models.  They 
also seek to extend risk model[]ing, albeit complemented with 
qualitative methods, [to] strategic and operational risk issues. . . . 
[They] strive to capture the complexity of risk decisions in the 
model design, including much judgment upfront, so that the 
output of models can be a close proxy to the underlying risk 
profile.  In this case, risk models reduce decision uncertainty, in 
the sense that they minimise room for disagreement among 
decision makers on the validity of the model output. . . . [Because 
many] judgmental issues are resolved in the model[]ing design, 
 
 298.  See id. at 35; Anette Mikes, Chief Risk Officers at Crunch Time: Compliance 
Champions or Business Partners, 2 J. RISK MGM’T IN FIN. INSTITUTIONS 7 (2008) 
[hereinafter CROs in Crunch Time]. 
 299.  See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 23 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941179 (“Directors repeatedly said that 
when it comes to risk management, tone at the top is critical.”); INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS, 
TONE AT THE TOP: PUTTING COSO’S THEORY INTO PRACTICE (2005); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INVESTIGATION INTO FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES AT THE 
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 4 (2004) (“Ultimately, the Board and the CEO must accept 
responsibility for the ‘tone at the top’ and the culture that exists in certain parts of [the 
firm]”). 
 300.  CROs in Crunch Time, supra note 299, at 16. 
 301.  See id. at 20-21 (discussing the costs involved in successfully developing both 
strategic advisor and strategic controller roles). 
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little or no disagreement surrounds the risk-adjusted performance 
metrics, enabling decision makers to manage risky ventures by 
the numbers . . . .
302
 
Of particular note from the perspective of modeling is that the risk 
manager’s effort is front-loaded:  once the risk manager creates a reliable 
and robust model, the model is set in motion according to largely 
automated corporate risk management procedures such as risk limits.  The 
risk assessment process is therefore crucial as threats need to be identified 
and the causal environment affecting them must be adequately addressed in 
the model.  This point cannot be overestimated:  when banks use value-at-
risk modeling techniques, the perceived risk of a position, portfolio, or firm 
depends in large part “on whether one technicality is used instead of 
another when designing [the] quantitative machine.”
303
 
The quantitative skeptic, by contrast, regards risk measurements as 
trend indicators to be taken into account alongside “managerial discretion, 
experience, and judgment.”
304
  Faith in modeling is not unique to the 
quantitative enthusiasts; the development of risk models is at the heart of 
both calculative cultures.
305
  But the quantitative skeptic is mindful of the 
ability to model.  Compared to the enthusiast, the skeptic marshals fewer 
institutional resources to create the perfect model and more resources on 
the back end where model results are contextualized.  The skeptics make 
extensive use of mathematical models as “learning tool[s]” in a multi-factor 
judgment process.
306
  Skeptics are particularly wary about the use of 
models in connection with operational and strategic risks.
307
 
Risk managers face competing demands from a diverse array of 
stakeholders, including creditors, regulators, corporate executives, 
shareholders, and even the general public.
308
  The resulting accountability 
challenge highlights the political-rhetorical nature of risk assessment.  
Stated another way, the diversity of calculative cultures follows from the 
 
 302.  Id. at 14-15. 
 303.  Pablo Triana, JPMorgan’s “Whale” Makes Big Splash on Key Risk Model, FIN. 
TIMES, May 29, 2012, at 20. 
 304.  CROs in Crunch Time, supra note 298, at 15. 
 305.  Id.; Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 7 (“Risk management tools tend to be 
highly analytical, data-driven techniques.  These are likely to strike a different chord in 
different managerial cultures.”).  
 306.  Id. at 36. 
 307.  CROs in Crunch Time, supra note 299, at 8. 
 308.  See COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC 
RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE CRMPG III 71 (2008) [hereinafter 
CRMPG III REPORT], available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG-III.pdf 
(“The goal of risk management is not to eliminate . . . risk, but to manage it effectively to 
provide the stakeholders of the institutions with long-term returns commensurate with the 
risk.”). 
WEBER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/21/2013  4:53 PM 
2013] THE LAW AND REGULATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT 1067 
 
political-rhetorical nature of these negotiations with various stakeholders.  
For example, shareholders and executives generally prefer a quantitatively 
enthusiastic risk management orientation.
309
  Such an approach affords 
executives operational ease and certainty, permitting them to conduct 
operations consistent with a given risk-and-return level.
310
  Similarly, 
quantitative enthusiasm assures shareholders that corporate decisions can 
be made according to a shareholder value imperative by optimizing returns 
for a given amount of risk, as well as cutting administrative costs 
associated with more nuanced, layered decisional frameworks.
311
  But this 
diversity persists in part because regulatory attention has preferred to focus 
on ever-broader visions of controls over the risk assessment process.  Thus, 
banks face a series of regulatory guidelines that are at once more ambitious 
in scope, yet increasingly distant from key issues of how risk impacts 
corporate and regulatory goals.  Simplifying only slightly, regulators 
command banks to control risk but offer little guidance on what constitutes 
a threat requiring attention (the political-rhetorical dimension of risk 
assessment) and how risk management departments should develop their 
understanding of how the threat might materialize (the descriptive-
relational dimension of risk assessment).  An influential industry-funded 
study of risk management notes that: 
[D]espite all of the complexities of risk management, the essence 
of risk monitoring and risk management is quite straightforward.  
Specifically, risk monitoring and management reduces to the 
basics of getting the right information, at the right time, to the 
right people, such that those people can make the most informed 
judgments possible.
312
 
Industry norms and regulatory guidance have made clear that senior 
management and, eventually, the board of directors are the “right people.”  
In so doing, those corporate actors are made accountable and responsible 
for risk.  But what is the “right information”?  Regulatory guidance has 
generally avoided answering this question. 
It might be objected that regulators have repeatedly intervened into 
risk management by describing the risks that must be subject to corporate 
control.  Indeed, risk description is one of the three overarching themes of 
the regulation of bank risk management described in Part II above.  For 
 
 309.  Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 3, 36. 
 310.  See Bhimani, supra note 109, at 3 (“The operationalization of risk management is 
ultimately aided by the capacity to regard risk as amenable to calculability and economistic 
representation.”). 
 311.  See id. at 2; Calculative Cultures, supra note 127, at 1 (observing that risk 
management “by the numbers” is “driven by a strong shareholder value imperative”). 
 312.  CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 308 at 70. 
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instance, the OCC handbook for examiners instructs its examiners to be 
mindful of eight specific categories of risk:  credit, interest rate, liquidity, 
price, operational, compliance, strategic, and reputation.  The Basel 
Committee has mandated specific capital charges based on risk 
management models applied with respect to market risk, credit risk, and 
operational risk.  Part II describes in some detail how bank regulators have 
provided extensive guidance with respect to certain categories of risk.  But 
these descriptions indicate general categories of potential exposures.  It is 
difficult to imagine any threat not easily falling into one of those 
categories.  While they are helpful to frame issues of risk and, perhaps 
more importantly, constitute a risk object for which responsibility must be 
allocated, they do not perform the difficult analytical work of identifying 
and measuring, probabilistically or otherwise, the contingent events that 
threaten those objectives. 
As Power noted, whether risk management—or, for that matter, the 
regulation of risk management—achieves its purposes for a given task is an 
empirical question.
313
  This article does not take up that research task, but a 
brief examination of some recent failures of risk management helps set out 
in relief the concerns that the alternative story presents with respect to risk 
management regulation.  Recent financial history demonstrates that risk 
management failures are commonplace, notwithstanding the expanding 
canon of regulatory guidance devoted to risk management.   
Some conceptual splitting is necessary here.  From the perspective of 
a bank’s board of directors and management, a risk management system 
will have failed if it does not perform as designed.  Typically, it will not 
have facilitated the assumption of risks in line with the risk appetite set by 
the board as implemented by senior management (Type 1 failure).  
Provided that the board and management have established and 
implemented risk preferences, Type 1 failures generally will result from 
errors in risk control, as distinguished from risk assessment.  By contrast, 
from the perspective of bank regulators, a risk management system will 
have failed if its operation compromises the public regulatory objectives of 
financial stability and institutional safety and soundness.  Typically it will 
have failed to prevent an institutional or system-wide crisis (Type 2 
failures).  Type 2 failures can relate either to risk control or risk 
assessment.  The set of circumstances giving rise to Type 1 failures 
overlaps, but is not coextensive, with the set of circumstances giving rise to 
Type 2 failures.
314
  Consider the recent example of J.P. Morgan 
 
 313.  See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 314.  See René M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They 
Happen? 5 (Ohio State Univ., Fisher Coll. of Bus., Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin. 
Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-03-017, 2008) (“A decision to take a known risk may turn 
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management authorizing a derivatives trading program, which they knew to 
be risky, involving a multi-part hedge of a credit derivatives index.  It 
resulted in a multi-billion dollar loss due to a failure to foresee the effects 
of an unpredicted event.  Such circumstances describe an obvious Type 2 
failure.  Bank regulators, charged with supervising institutional safety and 
soundness and systemic stability, would have preferred risk management 
systems in place to prevent such a risky trading program.  But if 
management assumed the risk voluntarily, then the losses do not represent 
a Type 1 failure.  Under those circumstances, the bank’s risk preferences 
influenced the construction of its analytical model and dictated the 
seriousness with which top decision makers in business units (including 
their unit risk managers) and the firm-wide risk management unit 
considered possible downside scenarios.  From the perspective of bank 
management, no risk management failure would have occurred.  Instead, it 
is the downside case of the old adage, “You win some, you lose some.”  Of 
course, there is nothing objectionable with a bank taking an entrepreneurial 
approach to risk-taking, but regulators and banks naturally have different 
tolerances for different types of risk. 
The report to shareholders that UBS prepared in the aftermath of its 
$20 billion losses associated with subprime-related assets in 2007 provides 
illustrations of both types of failures.
315
  The report cites several Type 1 
failures, such as the failure to follow through with plans to hire senior risk 
managers in the loss-making unit and insufficient communication between 
UBS’s research team, which had discovered deterioration in the subprime 
market, and relevant business units.
316
  These failures violate clear guidance 
from bank regulators concerning adequate staffing and communication 
concerning risk management, and they would have provided occasion for 
examiners to demand changes.  To the extent that regulators failed to take 
advantage of these opportunities (and it seems they in fact did so), the 
designers of regulatory policy might focus on building up on-site 
examination capacity and reinforcing, both to regulators and banks, the 
importance of these issues.  In short, these issues are already addressed in 
extant regulatory guidance and require adjustments on the margin in 
regulators’ emphasis and tone.  To remediate the failures, regulators would 
do well to bear in mind the Coglianese-Lazer model of MBR and stress the 
importance of planning an informational infrastructure within the firm. 
 
out poorly even though, at the time it was made, the expectation was that taking the risk 
increased shareholder wealth and hence was in the best interest of the shareholder.”). 
 315.  UBS, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS 4 (2008) [hereinafter UBS 
SUBPRIME REPORT]. 
 316.  See id. at 37-39 (providing a list of decisions that contributed to UBS’s risk 
management failures). 
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The Type 1 failures contrast with several Type 2 failures identified in 
the report.  The Type 2 failures reflect shortcomings in the risk assessment 
process.  For example, risk management at UBS modeled volatility, which 
is a key parameter of any financial model, for AAA-rated subprime 
exposures in the same manner as it did for other AAA exposures.
317
  As a 
result, its value-at-risk model revealed a minimal exposure at a high 
confidence level.  UBS compounded its problems by failing to examine the 
specific characteristics of the securities that it acquired, in particular highly 
structured products such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
318
  
These CDO securities are derivatives that reference, and are sometimes 
collateralized by, other securities that are themselves collateralized, most 
often by home mortgages.  The report’s findings are remarkably candid:  
“[T]here appears not to have been sufficient discussion of or actions upon 
concerns surrounding Subprime as an asset class until Q3 2007 . . . .”
319
  “It 
does not appear that [the market risk management team] thoroughly 
investigated the CDO business model.”
320
  Traders were permitted to retain 
so-called “super-senior” CDO tranches, which eventually would account 
for 50% of total losses at UBS, because risk managers had unwittingly 
assumed the market for such tranches would continually expand.
321
  
Perhaps most troublingly, the report found, “[T]here is no indication that 
[the market risk management team] was seeking views from other sources 
than [the] business [units].”
322
  UBS failed to conduct any analysis of the 
underlying home mortgage assets.  In each case, failure to probe the causal 
environment linking possible contingent events (i.e., rising defaults among 
subprime borrowers) to harms (i.e., massive write-downs that wipe out 
earnings and eventually impair capital) contributed to a corporate 
catastrophe that eventually resulted in $50 billion in losses and a taxpayer-
funded bailout.
323
  For example, by questioning the validity of AAA ratings 
 
 317.  Id. at 20, 37. 
 318.  UBS’s CDO desk accounted for two-thirds of the losses addressed in the report.  
Id. at 7.  The other largest contributors to UBS’s subprime exposure were an asset 
management unit and mismanagement of UBS’s group-wide treasury department. 
 319.  Id. at 37. 
 320.  Id. at 40. 
 321.  Id. at 14, 40. 
 322.  Id. at 40.  A U.S. Government Accountability Office study of financial regulators’ 
oversight of risk management systems at large financial institutions revealed that the 
problem of excessive deference to business units’ view of risk also affected financial 
regulators.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF 
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, 
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 19 (2009) [hereinafter GAO RM REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-499T (“Some regulators told us that they had relied 
on management representations of risk, especially in emerging areas.”).   
 323.  See Goran Miijuk, Prescription for UBS: ‘Hard Work’, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2009, 
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or “looking through” the CDOs to examine the FICO scores or second-lien 
status of the underlying mortgages, the causal connections would have been 
laid bare. 
These Type 2 failures point to a deeper problem relating to a 
fundamental failure of imagination by bank boards and managers.  When 
bank boards and managers decide just how much imagination to exercise 
when considering adverse events (or catastrophes), they are engaging the 
fundamental political-rhetorical question of risk assessment.  An industry-
funded diagnostic report on the subprime financial crisis implicitly made 
this point in the introductory paragraph to its risk management discussion.  
It noted that the “shortcomings in risk monitoring and risk management . . . 
reflect the fact that virtually all risk management tools are unable to 
model/present the most severe forms of financial shocks in a fashion that is 
credible to senior management.”
324
  The problem is one of capturing the 
attention span of management, a political endeavor if there ever was one. 
As a counterfactual, imagine a gadfly at meetings of UBS’s chief risk 
officer and its investment bank risk and governance committee constantly 
urging executives and committee members to approach their analytical 
models more skeptically and mindfully, perhaps even to consider the 
possibility of a once-in-a-lifetime liquidity crunch and asset value crash.  
“Oh,” the gadfly would add, “also consider that the government refuses to 
bail us out.”  Although the regulators would prefer for such deliberations to 
occur during the risk assessment phase, thus far they have not focused on 
embedding this perspective in risk management departments.
325
  It should 
not come as a surprise that a 2006 horizontal examination by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York of several large banks revealed that no banks 
were considering the possible effects of a severe economic downturn on the 
corporate group.
326
  Instead, risk managers were conducting isolated stress 
tests on particular portfolios based on single-parameter events such as 
housing market downturns, relying on its intuition with respect to stressed 
market events.  It is a commonplace that banks and regulators perceive 
different threats because they have different institutional objectives:  
 
at C2 (commenting on UBS’ losses and subsequent reorganization); see also TETT, supra 
note 238, at 243-44 (discussing the size of the broader bailout bailout). 
 324.  CRMPG III REPORT, supra note 309, at 70 (emphasis added). 
 325.  See Saul Hansell & Joseph B. Treaster, The Job of Imagining the Unimaginable, 
and Bracing for It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at C2 (“But the hardest thing for many on 
Wall Street—as for individual investors, lenders, insurers, mailroom workers, and frequent 
fliers—is trying to conclude which of the dark visions raised in daily news reports is the 
next nightmare plausible enough to allow it to color decision-making.”). 
 326.  See GAO RM REPORT, supra note 323, at 22-23 (noting that the stress tests focused 
on individual products rather than the institution as a whole and did not include “financial 
risks enterprise-wide”). 
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regulators are charged with promoting safety and soundness of individual 
institutions and stability throughout the financial system, whereas banks 
face pressure to meet expectations of shareholders, rating agencies, 
regulators, intra-firm business units, and creditors, which represent only a 
few of the more prominent stakeholders.
327
  This divergence affects the risk 
assessment process in predictable ways, as safety nets permit banks to 
assume super-optimal levels of risk from the perspective of the deposit 
insurer and the central bank, which are creditors of last resort.  Recall how 
Part II.D explained how capital adequacy regulation should be interpreted 
as a set of mandatory contract-like provisions, analogous to privately 
negotiated debt covenants, designed to protect these creditors from loss.  
To the extent that the capital requirements have been made to depend on 
risk assessment processes conducted by bank risk management 
departments, the divergence emerges as a real public policy problem.  
Regulation has only addressed this issue obliquely, failing to confront it 
head on. 
These microeconomic incentive-related problems with the political-
rhetorical dimension of risk assessment are only part of the problem.  
Complexity further frustrates risk assessment along its descriptive-
relational dimension.  The UBS report describes how “inadequate systems” 
and “infrastructure limitations” resulted in an “inability to obtain a 
portfolio view” of certain “complex products.”
328
  These system failures 
“became even more problematic with the business growth into more 
complex, higher margin products.”
329
  UBS’s experience in this regard was 
hardly unique.  The failures of risk modeling in the lead up to the subprime 
financial crisis have been documented extensively.
330
  The main problems 
are that the models underlying risk management programs, whether run by 
quantitative enthusiasts or skeptics, are unable to represent complex 
phenomena.  New research by complexity scientists reveals the many ways 
in which financial institutions transact in markets that are authentically 
complex, rather than merely complicated or difficult to understand.
331
  The 
complex markets in which financial institutions transact render them 
“susceptible to unpredictable and nonlinear phase transitions, positive 
feedback effects, ‘normal accidents,’ complexity catastrophes, and 
 
 327.  See SERGIO FOCARDI & CAROLINE JONAS, RISK MANAGEMENT: FRAMEWORK, 
METHODS, AND PRACTICE 5-7 (1998) (discussing the multiple objectives of risk management 
in financial firms). 
 328.  UBS SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 316, at 40. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  See, e.g., OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 (highlighting 
incentive structures, internal controls, and technical assumptions as failures of risk modeling 
that contributed to the financial crisis). 
 331.  See Weber, supra note 43, at 645. 
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conflicting constraints.”
332
  This significantly complicates the descriptive-
relational dimension of risk assessment.  Even where a bank has a clearly 
defined risk appetite, it might be impossible to predict when the market 
equilibrium on which an analytical model is premised will give way to 
disequilibrating shocks.  This problem is particularly acute with respect to 
value-at-risk models that are designed to disregard the extreme events that 
may emerge from market structures.  Thus, those risk managers who dream 
of a finance theory that approximates the physical sciences are wrong to 
hope that “[s]uch a theory . . . would allow us to predict the future course of 
events starting from a set of initial data.”
333
  In reality, quantitative finance 
is less a science than it is a phenomenological discipline constructed on 
“statistical arguments that are only partially constrained by the real 
world.”
334
  The real world of finance is so complex that the consequences 
of hypothetical “Newton’s laws of finance” could not be evaluated 
meaningfully.
335
  Even mere complicatedness, short of authentic 
complexity, can result in Type 2 failures.  One study found that more 
complicated instruments were insusceptible to consistent modeling.  
Specifically, a modeler would feed the same data into the model, and the 
model would generate two separate exposure estimates that varied by as 
much as thirty percent.
336
  These implementation issues further underscore 
the difficulties associated with elaborating causal risk environments.  
Under such circumstances, a bank’s institutional imagination in the 
political-rhetorical dimension of risk plays an even greater role. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article exposes several shortcomings of the traditional story of 
risk management regulation that portrays risk management as an effective 
antidote to instability in the financial sector.  The ever-expanding 
pretensions of control have in many respects advanced well beyond 
practical capabilities.  The future success of risk management regulation 
will depend on the extent to which bank regulators are able to shape the 
risk assessment process in ways that promote the public regulatory goals of 
institutional safety and soundness and systemic financial stability.  This 
 
 332.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 333.  FOCARDI & JONAS, supra note 327, at 14. 
 334.  JAN W. DASH, QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT: A PHYSICIST’S 
APPROACH 8 (2004). 
 335.  Id. 
 336.  See Christopher Marshall & Michael Siegel, Value at Risk: Implementing a Risk 
Measurement Standard, 4 J. DERIVATIVES 91, 107 (1997) (finding that implementation risk, 
which results from the disparity in value-at-risk estimates from the same model, is 
especially prevalent for complex financial instruments). 
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challenge will to some extent require encouraging banks to “routiniz[e], 
even bureaucratiz[e], the exercise of imagination”—an evocative phrase 
with which the 9-11 Commission charged federal law enforcement and 
foreign intelligence agencies to remediate organizational tendencies to 
resist consideration of extreme low-likelihood events.
337
  In formulating 
responses to the challenge, regulators should attempt to encourage banks to 
expand the frontier of the possible, looking to how so-called high-reliability 
organizations, such as nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, or air traffic 
control systems maintain reliability in conditions of stress and volatility.
338
  
The recent emphasis on stress testing at banks is a welcome overture in this 
direction that, if shepherded in the right way, could promise to bolster the 
effectiveness of risk management regulation.
339
  In the same vein, the Basel 
Committee announced in May 2012 that it is considering jettisoning the 
value-at-risk model for purposes of calculating market risk capital 
requirements in favor of an “expected shortfall” model that requires risk 
managers to populate the tails of the loss distributions.
340
 
 
 
 337.  NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 344 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
 338.  See generally KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE 
UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2d ed. 2007) 
(examining how organizations themselves perform in high risk settings). 
 339.  See Weber, supra note 18 (manuscript on file with author) (presenting a framework 
to encourage the use of stress tests). 
 340.  Trading Book Review, supra note 260, at 3, 20. 
